Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 27

Issue 3

Article 1

June 1949

The Original Jurisdiction of the Illinois Supreme Court
Justin A. Stanley

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Justin A. Stanley, The Original Jurisdiction of the Illinois Supreme Court, 27 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 189 (1949).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol27/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW
Copyright 1949, Chicago-Kent College of Law

VOLUM. 27

JUNE, 1949

NUMBER 3

DIVORCE UPON CONVICTION FOR CRIME
Warren A. Heindl*

T

of the law which concerns itself with the dissolution of the marital relation is probably not only the most
discussed but also the one best understood by the legal profession,
possibly because one of the first cases a practitioner is apt to
handle, after admission to the bar, is a divorce action. It is
surprising, therefore, to find one segment of this branch of law as
misunderstood and hazy in the minds of most lawyers as the
statutory ground which authorizes divorce upon the conviction or
imprisonment of one of the spouses for the commission of a crime.,
That lack of understanding may, however, result from the fact
HAT PORTION
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1 The wide-spread range of this ground for divorce is evidenced by the following

forty-four statutes: Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 34 § 20(4) ; Ariz. Code Anno. 1939, § 27-802
(3); Ark. Stat. Anno. 1947, § 34-1202(4); Deering's Civ. Code Calif. 1941, §92;
Colo. Stat. Anno. 1935, Ch. 56, § 1(8th); Conn. Gen. Stats. 1949, Ch. 367, § 7327;
Del. Rev. Code 1935, Ch. 86, § 3499(c) ; D. C. Code, Tit. 16, § 16-403; Ga. Code 1933,
Tit. 30, § 30-102(8) ; Ida. Code, Tit. 32, § 603(6) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 1;
Burn's Ind. Stat. Anno. 1933, § 3-1201(7); Iowa Code 1946, § 598.8(3) and § 598.9;
Kan. Gen. Stats. Anno. 1935, Ch. 60-1501 (10th) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. 1948, Ch. 403.020
(2) (c) ; Dart's La. Gen. Stat. Anno. 1939, § 2201; Me. Rev. Stat. 1944, Ch. 153, § 51;
Mass. Anno. Laws, 1948 Supp., Ch. 208, § 2; Mich. Stat. Anno., §§25.85-25.86; Minn.
Stat. Anno., § 518.06(4) ; Miss. Code Anno. 1942, § 2735(3rd) ; Mo. Rev. Stat. Anno.,
§ 1514; Mont. Rev. Code Anno. 1935, § 5736(6) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. 1943, § 42-301(3);
Nev. Comp. Laws Supp. 1931-41, § 9460(th); N. H. Rev. Laws 1942, Ch. 339,
§ 6(IV) ; Thompson's Laws of New York 1937, Domestic Relations Law, §§ 6 and 58;
New Mex. Stat. Anno. 1941, § 25-701(9) ; N. D. Rev. Code 1943, § 14-0503; Page's
Ohio Gen. Code, § 11979; Okla. Stat. Anno., Tit. 12, § 1271; Ore. Comp. Laws Anno.,
§ 9-907; Purdon's Penna. Stat. Anno., Tit. 23, § 10; R. I. Gen. Laws, Ch. 416, § 1;
S. D. Stat. 1939, §14.0703; William's Tenn. Code Anno. 1934, §§8426(5)-(6);
Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stats., Art. 4629(5) : Utah Code Anno. 1943, § 40-3-1(6) ; Vt.
Rev. Stats. 1947, Ch. 157, § 3205(11) ; Va. Code Anno. 1942, § 5103; Remington's
Wash. Rev. Stat. Anno., § 982(7); W. Va. Code Anno. 1943, § 4704; Wis. Stats.
1947, § 247.07(3) ; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Anno. 1945, § 3-5905(3).
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that (1) many of the statutory provisions are inadequate, leaving
doubt as to exactly what the statute will or will not permit; (2)
there is a lack of uniformity in the phraseology and content of
the provisions in the various jurisdictions; and (3) judicial decisions interpreting these enactments are relatively few in number,
but worse are often of little value outside of the jurisdiction
where pronounced because based on phraseology different from
that over which the searcher is concerned.
Before launching into any analysis of the various enactments
and the decisions based thereon, it may be beneficial to ascertain
the underlying philosophy which supports this statutory cause
for divorce. The conviction and incarceration for crime of one
of the parties to a marriage brings detriment to the innocent
spouse in two respects: (1) not only in humiliation suffered, but
(2) the imprisoned party is no longer capable of fulfilling the
marital duties undertaken when the marriage was solemnized. By
permitting a dissolution of the marriage under such circumstances,
the law attempts to rectify some of the injustice suffered by the
innocent spouse. It obviously cannot remove the stigma too
frequently attached to those who have, no matter how innocently,
been associated with criminals. By making it possible to destroy
the baleful union, however, the law permits the innocent spouse
to seek fulfillment of the purposes of marriage in another union,
if that is desired.
Without the presence of a specific statutory provision permitting a divorce on this ground, conviction and imprisonment
for crime is not a cause for dissolution of marital ties.2 Attempts
have been made, however, to utilize such occurrences in conjunction with other recognized statutory grounds. It has been argued
that conduct of the kind in question amounts to cruelty inflicted
upon the innocent party 3 but, when refusing to recognize this
contention, courts have stated that while the felon may be a
menace to society it does not follow that he or she is likewise a
2 Sharman v. Sharman, 18 Tex. 521 (1857).

3 Dion v. Dion, 93 Minn. 201, 100 N. W. 1101 (1904) ; Sharman v. Sharman, 18
Tex. 521 (1857) ; Lucas v. Lucas, 2 Tex. 112 (1847).
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menace to the person of the other spouse.' It has also been
asserted that the term of imprisonment may be counted in the
period necessary for divorce for desertion. Jurisdictions which
have answered in the negative base their holdings on the concept
that voluntary separation is of the essence of desertion, hence
imprisonment for crime, being involuntary, should not be considered.5 An affirmative answer, on the other hand, has been reached
upon the logic that incarceration amounts to a voluntary separation since it is the natural consequence of voluntarily engaging
in criminal conduct.6 Assimilation of conviction for crime with
other recognized grounds for divorce is not possible except by so
strained a construction as to border on the ridiculous.
Where statutes on the subject do exist, the first question of
importance would seem to turn on the point as to when the events
which give rise to the action must occur. Should it be necessary
that they take place after marriage, or will cause exist if they
happened prior thereto ? A specific answer has been provided by
the statutes in some of the states. Not a few jurisdictions require
that the conviction and imprisonment must take place subsequent
to the marriage, 7 but some embody separate provisions permitting
divorce where the conviction was antenuptial in character provided the innocent spouse had no knowledge thereof at the time
the marriage was celebrated.8 Those enactments which are silent
on this point leave the door wide open to speculation. No court
4 In Wright v. Wright, 6 Tex. 3 (1851), however, the court granted a divorce on
the ground of cruelty, holding that a spouse commits an outrage against his mate
when he kills his stepson.
5 Truman v. Truman, 36 Del. 104, 171 A. 453 (1934) ; Porritt v. Porritt, 18 Mich.
420 (1869) ; Hyland v. Hyland, 55 N. J. Eq. 35, 36 A. 270 (1896) ; Wolf v. Wolf,

38 N. J. Eq. 128 (1884) ; Sitterson v. Sitterson, 191 N. C. 319, 131 S. E. 641 (1926).
Where, however, the imprisonment occurred after a voluntary desertion had begun,
an opposite result has been reached: Hews v. Hews, 73 Mass. 279 (1856) ; Csanyi
v. Csanyi, 93 N. J. Eq. 11, 115 A. 76 (1921).

6 Liberato v. Liberato, 93 N. H. 219, 38 A. (2d) 880 (1944).
7 See the statutes of Colo., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Minn., Mo., N. Mex., Okla., Tex., Va.,
W. Va., Wis. The same result may be implied from phraseology to be found in the
statutes of Mass., Mich., Neb., N. Y., Ohio, R. I., Vt., Wash., and Wyo. Editorial
note: Except where specific reference is essential, all statutes intended are those
tabulated in footnote 1, ante.
8 Ariz. Code Anno. 1939, § 27-802(7) ; Mo. Rev. Stat. Anno., § 1514; Va. Code
Anno. 1942, § 5103; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Anno. 1945, § 3-5905(10).
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has ever been faced with the necessity of providing a ruling,9 but
is it not reasonable to believe that it was the intent of the legislature to make the statute operative only in cases where the conviction and imprisonment took place subsequent to the marriage?
Other grounds for divorce such as cruelty, desertion, drunkenness and the like, can arise only after inception of a valid marriage.
Is it not likely, then, that the legislators took it for granted that
the same interpretation would be given to the clause regarding
conviction and imprisonment for crime? Whether or not such
logic approximates justice is another question. It would seem
that the effect upon the innocent spouse would be the same
whether the conviction be imposed for acts done before or after
the marriage was entered into. There may be some escape, in the
former situation, by way of annulment for the non-disclosure of
the prior conviction for crime'0 but, in the absence thereof, the
person unfortunate enough to unwittingly marry a convicted felon
would be in a sorry plight indeed.
Naturally, only the commission of those crimes or offenses
designated in the various statutes can serve as the basis for the
dissolution of a marriage. The designation has been made directly,
as by naming specific crimes or by specifying certain classes of
crimes, or indirectly, by using the type or extent of the punishment
as the criterion. The first of these methods is utilized in Pennsylvania, where the statute lists the precise offenses, the commission of any one of which will be considered as a ground for
divorce." Under a provision of that type there can be little or
9 In Caswell v. Caswell, 64 Vt. 557, 24 A. 988 (1892), the plaintiff was refused a
divorce in a case where the defendant was under sentence for murder when the
marriage took place. An appeal was then pending but, subsequent to the marriage,
the conviction was affirmed. The court stated that, as the defendant was convicted
before the marriage, the plaintiff could not thereafter obtain a divorce. It would
seem, however, that the case turned on the fact that the plaintiff had knowledge of
the existence of the conviction before entering into the marriage.
10 Prior conviction for crime, unknown to the spouse, was treated as sufficient to
warrant annulment in Brown v. Scott, 140 Md. 258, 117 A. 114, 22 A. L. R. 810
(1922).
11 The designation of specific crimes in that state was probably brought about by
the fact that the lower courts of Pennsylvania, at one time, had considerable difficulty determining which offenses were included in the term "infamous crime," as
used in a prior statute. Compare, for example, Hess v. Hess, 23 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep.
135 (1899), with Nevergold v. Nevergold, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 108 (1897), to see how
courts of the same state can disagree as to the degree of infamy involved in the
crime of burglary.
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no uncertainty as to what crimes come within the purview of the
statute.12 Reference to the list is all that is necessary to determine
whether or not the particular offense involved is named therein.
But difficulty may arise where the conviction has occurred in
another jurisdiction1 3 and the name given thereto is not identical
with any of those embodied in the statutory list albeit the basic
elements of the crime do conform. A Pennsylvania court would
then have to decide whether it was the name or the nature of the
offense which should possess importance. It may be that the
courts of that state will be saved from any such dilemma for
most of the crimes catalogued are well-known common law offenses
the names of which are not likely to differ from state to state.
The point is stressed, however, to show how this type of classification does not necessarily solve all doubts concerned in the subject.
Most states have adopted the second alternative method when
classifying the crimes comprehended by the statute as a ground
for divorce. Thus, it is necessary in many jurisdictions that the
offense committed be a "felony. 1' 4 That term had a definite
meaning at common law 5 and, despite statutory modification, 16
it has seemingly presented no particular difficulty, judging by the
absence of decisions involving its application. 1 7 Still other states
12 In Tyler v. Tyler, 10 Pa. D. & C. Rep. 773 (1926), the court held that, as the
crime of transporting stolen property was not included in the statutory 'list, no
divorce could be granted in a case where the defendant had violated the National
Motor Vehicle Theft Act, 18 U. S. C. A. § 408.
13 The Pennsylvania statute allows the granting of a divorce where the crime and
conviction occurs outside the state, but not all statutes are of that character. See
note 97 et seq., post.
14 Ariz., Calif., Colo., Ida., Iowa, Ky., Mont., N. Mex., N. D., Okla., Ore., S. D.,
Tex., Utah, W. Va., Wyo. The D. C. Code modifies the term "felony" by making it
necessary that it be one involving moral turpitude.
15 Felonies were crimes for conviction of which the estate of the convict was
forfeited: 4 BI. Comm. 95.
16 Statutes defining the term "felony" have been enacted in England and in many
American jurisdictions: 16 C. J., Criminal Law, § 6; 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, § 6.
See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 585, where a felony Is defined as
... an offense punishable with death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary."
17 It became necessary, in Getz v. Getz, 332 Ill. App. 364, 75 N. E. (2d) 530
(1947), noted in 23 Notre Dame Law. 405, for the court to decide whether a conviction by a military court for desertion from the armed forces in time of war was
a conviction for a felony within the meaning of the Illinois divorce statute. The
court concluded that, as the court martial could have prescribed a punishment less
than death or imprisonment, the offense did not come within the definition of felony
laid down In Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 585. The punishment imposed was imprisonment, but the court conceived itself to be governed not by what actually
occurred but rather by what might have occurred.
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use the term "infamous crime" to designate the class of offenses
for which a divorce may be granted," although one modifies even
that term somewhat. 19 Determination of the point as to what
crimes are to be considered of "infamous" nature may call for
the utilization of two common tests, the first stressing the character of the crime, the second the nature or character of the punish21
ment, 20 but the latter seems to have found favor in this country.
As neither of these tests can be applied with any degree of mathematical precision, it is not surprising that courts, even in the
same jurisdiction, will differ as to whether a crime involves some
degree of infamy. Some courts, interpreting the term in divorce
cases, have held that larceny, 22 burglary, 23 assault with intent to
rape, 24 and horse stealing 25 were not infamous crimes; while other
tribunals have considered that petty larceny, 26 burglary,27 rape, 28
manslaughter, 29 and the making of false entries in bank ledgers 0
fall within that category. Obviously, the determination of exactly
what is an infamous crime must depend upon the view of the
3
individual jurisdiction1.
18 C.f., Indiana. The alternative of "infamous crime" or "felony" appears in the
statutes of Ark., Ill., Mo., Nev., and Tenn., so the commission of a crime falling into
either classification would be sufficient. For an application of this idea, see Hartwig
v. Hartwig, 160 Mo. App. 284, 142 S. W. 797 (1912).
19 The Connecticut statute makes it necessary that the infamous crime involve a
"Violation of conjugal duty." See Swanson v. Swanson. 128 Conn. 128. 20 A. (2d)
617 (1941), holding that a conviction for assault to commit rape satisfied the
statutory requirement.
20 A complete discussion of these tests is set forth in 14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law,
§ 4.
21 16 C. J., Criminal Law, § 11. Illinois now designates by statute the crimes
considered infamous: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 587. But see Getz v. Getz, 332
Ill. App. 364, 75 N. E. (2d) 539 (1947).
22 Bailey v. Bailey, 26 Pa. Co. Rep. 553 (1902).
23 Nevergold v. Nevergold, 20 Pa. Co. Rep. 108 (1897).
24 Wheeler v. Wheeler, 2 Pa. Dist. Rep. 567 (1893).
25 Collins v. Collins, 28 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 47 (1902).
26 Hartwig v. Hartwig, 160 Mo. App. 284, 142 S. W. 797 (1912).
27 Hess v. Hess, 22 Pa. Co. Rep. 135 (1899).
28 Polson v. Polson, 140 Ind. 310, 39 N. E. 498 (1895).
29 Sutherlin v. Sutherlin, 27 Ind. App. 301, 61 N. E. 206 (1901).
30 Seiple v. Seiple, 26 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 99 (1901).
31 A list of crimes considered infamous in the various states appears in an annotation to be found in 24 A. L. R. 1002.
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The vaguest of all terms used to measure the type of crime
sufficient for divorce is that of "moral turpitude. "2 On the two
occasions when it became necessary for courts to determine
whether or not a specific crime involved moral turpitude, it was
found that convictions for voluntary manslaughter 3 3 as well as
for violation of the Harrison Narcotic Act 3 4 did do so. In neither
of these cases, however, did the courts concerned shed much light
upon the exact elements of moral turpitude and, unfortunately,
where this term has been utilized in other types of statutes, it
has not received either a concrete or a consistent interpretation.
The most prevalent definition, in substance, would suggest that
moral turpitude involves any act contrary to good morals, honesty,
and justice.3 5 Such a definition, obviously, encompasses all criminal conduct. A much more restricted interpretation, applied by
other courts to other situations, requires that aspects of baseness,
vileness, or depravity must be present.3 6 Much will depend upon
the selection of definitions made in any given divorce case.
Naturally, the broader the definition, the more offenses will be
included in the actionable list. The selection may be governed,
however, by considerations of local policy in matters of divorce,
some courts being strict, others loose, in granting dissolution of
the marital relationship.
Many states do not directly indicate, either by specific or by
class name, the crimes which fall within the purview of their
several statutes. They do, however, by designating the type of
punishment which the guilty spouse must suffer, indirectly specify
the significant offenses. Thus, by designating that the punishment must entail life imprisonment,3 7 imprisonment for a specific
32 The term is found in the D. C. and Georgia Codes.
33 Holloway v. Holloway, 126 Ga. 459, 55 S. E. 191 (1906).
34 Menna v. Menna, 102 F. (2d) 617 (1939), noted in 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 497.
35 Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Company, 95 Conn. 500, Ili. A. 861 (1920).
36 U. S. ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534 (1947). The consequence
to the defendant therein, if found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.
would have been deportation. This fact might explain the reason for insisting upon
a strict and narrow definition. For other definitions of moral turpitude, see Words
and Phrases (Perm. Ed.), Vol. 27.
37 Conn., Maine, Mass., Mich., N. Y., R.

I.,

Vt.
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term, 8 imprisonment in the penitentiary, 9 prison or reformatory,4 0 or be an ignominious punishment, 4' these states do place a
limit on the crimes considered adequate to warrant divorce. It
is unnecessary, in such situations, to determine whether any given
offense is included within the definition of a felony, an infamous
crime, or a crime involving moral turpitude, but it would appear
that, under enactments of this type, that the list is quite selective.
It would seem, at first glance, that there could be very little chance
for confusion thereunder for the punishment specified in the
sentence of the court is usually definite both as to the place and
the term of incarceration. As will be explained later, however,
such terms as "penitentiary, " .
"prison, ". reformatory," and the
like are, unfortunately, susceptible to several definitions thereby
engendering some degree of uncertainty. For that matter, such a
term as "ignominious punishment" is not easily defined.4 2 It is
no simple matter, therefore, to decide whether or not the guilty
spouse has become involved in criminal conduct of the character or
degree contemplated by the legislature.
Even if that fact be determined, it must be noted that a mere
charge that the defendant in the divorce action has committed
one of the abovementioned crimes will not establish a ground for
divorce in most jurisdictions4 3 for there must, usually, have been
a judicial determination of the individual's guilt. Such is clearly
the case where the statute provides that there must have been a
".conviction ' 4 4 or a "condemnation." 4 5 It will be implied where
38 Del., Mass., Mich., Neb., N. H., Vt., Wis. In Clark v. Clark, 94 N. H. 398, 54 A.
(2d) 166 (1947), the court held that, since the defendant was actually imprisoned
after his conviction by a court martial, grounds for divorce existed.
39 Miss., Ohio.
40 Minn., Wash.
41 Dart's La. Gen. Stat. Anno. 1939, § 2201.
42 See Hull v. Donze, 164 La. 199, 113 So. 816 (1927).
43 There are states which do allow a dissolution of the marriage where one spouse
is charged with crime provided he or she has fled the jurisdiction: Dart's La. Gen.
Stat. Anno. 1939, § 2201; Va. Code Anno. 1942, § 5103. The Louisiana statute imposes
the duty on the party seeking the divorce to produce evidence showing that the
other is actually guilty of the crime charged. The Virginia statute makes it necessary that the accused spouse be absent from the jurisdiction for two years.
44 Ariz., Ark., Calif., Colo., Del., D. C., Ga., Ida., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Mo., Mont.,
Nev., N. H., N. Mex., N. D., and Okla. The court, in Thomas v. Thomas, 51 Ill. 162
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the statute provides that there must be a "sentence' 6 or "imprisonment," ' 47 for these only follow a conviction. Necessarily,
the term "conviction" implies a criminal proceeding 48 conducted
in a legal manner 49 conforming to due process of law. Even so,
some statutes contain phrases intended to leave no doubt about
this. Such items as conviction "in a competent court having
jurisdiction,'' 50 "as a result of trial,'' 51 and "in a court of record 1 . 2 are sometimes found inserted, but they would appear to
add nothing, and the absence thereof in the other statutes does not
render them subject to criticism.
One important qualification regarding the criminal proceeding
is found in two states. It serves to prevent divorce where the
accused spouse was convicted on the testimony of the spouse seeking dissolution of the marriage. 53 The limitation was probably
designed to prevent a spouse from perjuring herself or himself
at the criminal trial with the hope that the termination of the
marriage might thereby be facilitated. It is not clear, however,
exactly what is meant by the phrase "convicted on the testimony
of the spouse." Is the divorce to be barred only when the testimony given by a spouse was primarily instrumental in obtaining
(1869), stated that it was not prepared to hold that the commission of a crime
without a conviction is a ground for divorce.
45 The Kentucky and the Louisiana statutes both use the term "condemnation"
for "conviction." In Davis v. Davis, 102 Ky. 440, 43 S. W. 168 (1897), the court
inferentially held the terms were synonymous.
46 Conn., Me., Mass., Mich., Minn., Miss., Neb., Va., W. Va., and Wis.
47 Ala., Ohio, Wash.
48 Ammidon v. Smith, 14 U. S. (1 Wheat.) 447, 4 L. Ed. 132 (1816).
See also
Ann. Cas. 1915B 284. In Getz v. Getz, 332 Ill. App. 364, 75 N. E. (2d) 530 (1947),
the court felt that only a criminal proceeding in a civil court, in contrast to one
before a military tribunal, would satisfy the statute. For an opposite result, see
Clark v. Clark, 94 N. H. 398, 54 A. (2d) 166 (1947), where a court martial conviction was held to be within the statute, the court stating that the nature of the
tribunal was not controlling. See comment in 28 Bost. U. L. Rev. 222.
49 Smith v. Thomas, 149 N. C. 100, 62 S. E. 772 (1908).
See also Ann. Cas. 1915B
283.
50 Del. and Pa. Under the Delaware and Vermont statutes, the accused must have
had opportunity for trial by jury if the conviction relied upon took place in a
foreign country.
51 Delaware. The same phrase appears in the Vermont act except that it there
has reference to convictions which take place in other states.
52

Colorado.

53

See the Arizona and Texas statutes.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW.

the conviction, or is the stipulation operative whenever any testimony is given, even though it be a formal or insignificant part of
the state's case? Application of the former construction to the
stipulation would make it necessary to determine exactly how
important the husband's or wife's testimony was to the case of
the prosecution and could lead to a great many difficulties. On
the other hand, adoption of the latter interpretation might mitigate against the possibility of one spouse being willing to testify
against the other, to the consequent disadvantage of the state.
Even after the guilt of the individual has been determined in
a judicial proceeding, the ground for divorce may not have yet
materialized. Many states insist that the individual must be
sentenced, 54 an. idea at least implicit in those jurisdictions where
the statutes require imprisonment 55 for, in the normal course of
events, incarceration takes place only after the court's judgment
has been rendered. Difficulty could arise, however, in determining
whether actual sentence is necessary where the statute merely
requires a conviction.56 If the popular conception of the word
''conviction" is utilized, the ground for divorce would accrue
after motion for new trial had been denied, if not after the rendition of the verdict, without the necessity of the court imposing
sentence. 57 On the other hand, the technical definition of "conviction" includes both the verdict and the sentence thereon. 58 Thus,
using this interpretation, the court's judgment would have to be
pronounced before cause for divorce could accrue but the elements
of the term "conviction" have never been determined in relation
to these divorce provisions, so it is a matter of speculation as to
which definition will find favor if and when the question arises.
The next item of importance is to attempt to determine what
54 Ala., Ariz., Conn., Del., D. C., Ga., Me., Mass., Mich., Minn., Miss., Neb., N. Y..
Ohio, Pa., Tenn., Vt., W. Va., Wis., and Wyo.
55 Kan., N. Mex., Okla., Tex., Wash.
56 Ark., Calif., Colo., Ida., Ill., Ind., Iowa, *Mo., Mont., Nev., N. H., N. D., Ore.,
R. I., S. D., Tenn., and Utah.
57 Quintard v. Knoedler, 53 Conn. 485, 2 A. 752 (1885).
See also Ann. Cas. 1915B
285.
58 Commonwealth v. McDermott, 224 Pa. 363, 73 A. 427 (1909). See also Ann. Cas.
1915B 287.
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the terms of the sentence must be in order to satisfy the various
enactments. In a number of jurisdictions, the statutes specify
that the sentence must be for a stipulated period of time, as for
life, 59 not less than two years, 60 three years, 6 1 five years, 62 or as
much as seven years. 63 With the development, in recent years, of
the indeterminate sentence, a problem has arisen under statutes
of this type. In all of the cases considering the problem, the
minimum term of confinement was less than that required by the
divorce statute but the maximum term was equal to it or greater.
It was argued by the defendants therein that the minimum time
should be considered as controlling the length of the sentence for
this purpose, hence divorce should be denied. 4 The courts, by
contrast, have been uniform in holding that it is the maximum
time which controls. 65 The gist of these decisions has been that
the maximum term must be served before the convict can, as a
matter of right, demand his release. He can only obtain his liberty
before that time if those in charge of the penal system should
deem it proper to permit an earlier release. Somewhat analogous
is the question concerning the effect of two or more consecutive
sentences. In one case, that of Kauffman v. Kauffman,66 the
defendant had been convicted on two charges of crime and had
been sentenced to one and one-half years for each offense. The
Pennsylvania statute made it necessary that the party be sentenced for a term exceeding two years before a divorce could
be granted. It was held that, even though the sentences ran consecutively, they could not be joined in order to add up to the
Conn., Me., Mass., Mich., N. Y., Vt.
D. C., Ga., Pa.
61 Mich., Neb., Vt., Wis.
62 Mass.
63 Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 34, § 20(4).
64 Only the Delaware statute gives specific recognition to the indeterminate sentence. In that state there must be continuous imprisonment for at least two years
but, if an indeterminate sentence is involved, one year is sufficient to support
divorce.
65 Oliver v. Oliver, 169 Mass. 592, 48 N. E. 843 (1897) ; Studley v. Studley, 129
Neb. 784, 263 N. W. 139 (1935) ; Fagan v. Fagan, 14 Pa. D. & C. Rep. 116 (1929) ;
Miller v. Miller, 9 Pa. D. & C. Rep. 437 (1927) ; Singleton v. Singleton, 42 Pa. Co.
Ct. Rep. 396 (1915) ; Sargood v. Sargood, 77 Vt. 498, 61 A. 472 (1905).
66 24 Pa. Sup. Ct. Rep. 437 (1904).
59

60
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required period.67 Many of the statutes do not contain a recital
of the specific number of years for which the sentence must
run so the length of the sentence, in these states, is not a controlling factor although other requirements, to be discussed hereafter, may be important.
An additional requirement, found in both types of statutes,
makes it mandatory that the incarceration take place in a specific
type of institution. Referring to the place of imprisonment,
statutory language varies from "in a penitentiary" under the
Ohio statute, 68 through in "the penitentiary ' 69 or "to any penitentiary" as in Mississippi;70 from "in the state prison," ' 71 or
"in any prison," 72 through "in any state prison or reformatory,'' 73 "in any prison, jail, or house of correction,'' 74 "in a
state penal institution," 75 and "to a penal institution,"7 6 up
77
to "in a penal or reformatory institution," as in Massachusetts.
Where the convict is sentenced to confinement in the exact institution mentioned in the divorce statute, no difficulty is encountered. Where the place of incarceration specified in the sentence
does not conform to that stipulated in the statute, a question
of interpretation can well arise. One court, for example, construed the phrase "in any prison, jail, or house of correction"
as broad enough to include a women's reformatory 78 since the
same was on an equivalent penal level with the men's penitentiary, an institution clearly deemed included in the quoted phrase.
In another decision, the court reached the conclusion that a re67 For a discussion as to whether or not sentences running concurrently should be
added up to equal the necessary term, see 9 Australian L. J. 332 and 11 Australian
L. J. 101.
68 Page's Ohio Gen. Code, § 11979.

See Ala., Ga., N. Mex., Okla., Tenn., and Va.
Miss. Code Anno. 1942, § 2735(3rd).
71 Conn., Tex., Vt.
72 Wyo. Comp. Stat. Anno. 1945, § 3-5905(3).
73-Minn. Stat. Anno., § 518.06(4).
74 Michigan and Nebraska.
75 Remington's Wash. Rev. Stat. Anno., § 982(7).
76 D. C. Code, Tit. 16, § 16-403.
77 Mass. Anno. Laws, 1948 Supp., Ch.208, § 2.
78 Studley v. Studley, 129 Neb. 784, 263 N. W. 139 (1935).
69
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formatory was included in the phrase "in a penitentiary, ' '7
despite the fact that the treatment accorded prisoners in the
former was different from that meted out in the latter institution.
The decision appears to have rested on the fact that the article
''a " appeared before the term ''penitentiary,'' indicating to the
court that the legislature did not have any particular institution
in mind when it drafted the divorce statute.
In two other decisions, however, the courts were not as liberal
in their construction of statutory terminology. In one of these
cases, that of Dion v. Dion, 0 the Minnesota court relied on the
difference in the treatment accorded inmates of a reformatory by
contrast to that accorded in the "state prison," the former being
substantially different from the latter, to show that no cause for
divorce existed. The court also pointed to the fact that the
reformatory was built after the divorce statute had been enacted,
hence could not have been in the contemplation of the legislature.
Both of these arguments also made their appearance in another
case s ' and were upheld, the court concluding that the term "state
prison, jail, or house of correction" did not include a reformatory.
Unless the sentence to one type of institution could mean that the
confinement would be longer than in another, there should be no
valid reason for distinguishing between two penal institutions in
determining whether or not a divorce should be granted. So far
as the innocent spouse is concerned, the result is the same whether
the convicted person is sent to the state prison, penitentiary,
reformatory, house of correction, or any other type of penal institution. In any event, the guilty spouse is still unable to perform
the marital duties.
Still other statutes contain no limitation upon the type of
sentence rendered either with respect to its length or to the place
of confinement. These may be divided into two groups: (1) those
which mention imprisonment by way of such phrases as "senBowers v. Bowers, 114 Ohio 568, 151 N. E. 750 (1926).
Minn. 276, 100 N. W. 4 (1904).
81 Unsoeld v. Unsoeld, 216 Mass. 594, 104 N. E. 462 (1914).
Donze, 164 La. 199, 113 So. 816 (1927).
79

8092

See also Hull v.
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'
tenced to imprisonment "82
or "conviction and imprisonment; "18 3
and (2) those which do not make any mention, either directly or
indirectly, that the sentence handed down be one providing for
imprisonment. 8 4 Obviously, those falling within the first category
contemplate a sentence to some type of imprisonment, though the
length of the confinement is of no consequence. In the second
group the necessity for a sentence may be implied, 85 but there is
absolutely nothing which requires that it amount to imprisonment
or incarceration. However, since the crimes enumerated under
these provisions are felonies and infamous offenses, a conviction
would, under ordinary circumstances, be followed by a prison
86
sentence of some kind.

Once there has been a conviction, with the required sentence
pronounced thereon, does this complete the ground on which a
divorce may be based, or is actual imprisonment necessary? Here,
again, the answer depends wholly upon the wording of the individual state statute. In order to adequately analyse the situation it is
necessary to recognize that the statutes again fall within two
groups: (1) those that either directly or indirectly indicate that
actual confinement is necessary, and (2) those which are silent on
the matter.
Within the first group, two jurisdictions make it necessary
that there be an actual imprisonment for a specified number of
years. 87 It is apparent, under these statutes, that the right to
divorce does not accrue until the expiration of the time stipulated.
Others, while directly mentioning imprisonment, do so without
82 Ariz., W. Va.
83 Del., Kan.
84 All that is indicated in the following statutes is that there must be a conviction
or condemnation; nothing is said with reference to the type of punishment: Ark.,
Calif., Colo., Ida., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Ky., Mo., Mont., Nev., N. D., Ore., S. D., Tenn.,
and Utah.
85 The term "conviction" has been, on some occasions, interpreted as including
both the verdict and sentence thereon: Commonwealth v. McDermott, 224 Pa. 363,
73 A. 427 (1909).
86 For instance, in Illinois, by definition the term "felony" names a crime which
is punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947,
Ch. 38, § 585.
87 Ala., Del.
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indicating that any specific duration of confinement is necessary. s8
There are also a few states within this first group that indirectly
make actual incarceration a necessary element, for the action for
divorce can only be brought at the time the party is confined. s9
Logic would dictate that the right to a judicial dissolution of
marriage under these provisions does not accrue until there has
been an actual confinement, although presumably the cause arises
at the very moment the individual is placed in the custody of the
requisite prison or penitentiary official.
The New Mexico case of Klasner v. Klasner" throws some
light in that regard for it presents an unusual factual situation
requiring the court to determine whether or not the term "imprisonment" meant actual confinement behind prison bars. The
defendant there had been convicted and the conviction had been
affirmed by an upper court. While she was at liberty, but after
receiving the commitment order from the clerk of the court, she
went to the governor to plead for a pardon. He indicated he
would grant a pardon, but stated that she had to deliver the commitment order to the warden of the prison to which she had been
sentenced. She did so deliver the order, at which time her name
was enrolled on the prison books and she was given a number.
The warden then permitted her to return to the governor, from
whom she received her pardon. In an action for a divorce brought
by the defendant's spouse, it was argued that since she had not
been placed in a cell nor confined within the walls of a penal institution, she had not been imprisoned within the contemplation of the
divorce statute. The court, however, held that, from the time
she delivered the commitment order until she had received a pardon, the defendant was in the custody of the warden and therefore
technically in prison even though not actually confined. The deci88 D. C., Kan., Me., N. H., N. Mex., Ohio, Okla., Tex., Wash. See also the Rhode
Island statute, Ch. 416, § 1 and its companion section, Ch. 624, § 1.
89 See statutes of Vermont and West virginai. The Mississippi statute specifies
that the convicted spouse must be ". . . sentenced to any penitentiary and not pardoned before being sent there." The phrase "sent there" would seem to indicate
that the legislature intended that the party be actually incarcerated before the
divorce could be obtained.
9023 N. Mex. 627, 170 P. 745 (1918).
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sion is of considerable significance, for by ordinary definition the
term "imprisonment" involves confinement or incarcerationY1
Statutes falling in the second group, namely those that do
not directly or indirectly provide that actual confinement is necessary, merely state that the individual must be "sentenced to
imprisonment," 9 2 "sentenced to confinement,'"93 or be "convicted. "9 By no stretch of the imagination can any one of these
terms or phrases be interpreted to mean that actual confinement
is necessary before the ground for divorce accrues. The term
"sentenced" more nearly refers to the pronouncement by the
court of the punishment that is to be inflicted,9 5 while the added
terms IIimprisonment ' or '' confinementI ' indicate what the nature
of that punishment is to be. The two terms, when joined, do not
extend the concept so as to require the carrying out of the punishment. In much the same way, all that can be inferred from the
terms "convicted' ' or '' conviction" is that there must be a verdict
of guilty and sentence based-thereon, 9 6 but not that there must be
actual imprisonment. In states with statutes of the second category, then, the pronouncement of the sentence would appear to be
all that is necessary to establish a basis for divorce, even though
the sentence be a suspended one. If the reason for allowing
divorce on this ground lies in the fact that an imprisoned person
is unable to perform the marital duties, it would seem reasonable
to make actual imprisonment a necessary element even though the
statute does not specifically require it. On the other hand, conviction and sentence will bring about humiliation and disgrace even
in the absence of actual imprisonment. It is submitted, therefore,
that where the enactment does not mention actual imprisonment
much will again depend upon the divorce policy of any given state.
Having ascertained that certain events must take place before
91 State v. Woodward, 123 Ind. 30, 23 N. E. 968 (1890).
92 Ariz., Conn., Ga., Mich., Minn., Neb., Pa., Wis., and Wyo.
93 Mass., Tenn., Va.
94 Ark., Calif., Colo., Ida., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Ky., La., Mo., Mont., Nev.. N. D., Ore..
S. D., Tenn., and Utah.
95 Featherstone v. People, 194 Ill. 325, 62 N. E. 684 (1902).
9G Commonwealth v. McDermott, 224 Pa. 363, 73 A. 427 (1909).
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a cause of action for divorce can accrue, it is necessary to determine whether the place of their occurrence is important. Does the
innocent spouse have ground for divorce where the conviction,
sentence, and imprisonment if necessary, take place in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the divorce action is instituted?
The events might have occurred in the same or another federal
district, in another state, or even in a foreign country. Again,
the solution to the problem depends wholly upon the wording of
the statute. Where the state statutes specifically provide that the
incidents leading up to the cause of action may occur outside of
the jurisdiction, there is no uniformity in terminology to describe
exactly where they may take place. Thus, some permit a divorce
where the conviction and imprisonment occurs in any state, federal
district, territory, or foreign country.9 7 This all-inclusiveness can
also be inferred in other statutes from provisions indicating that
the conviction, or the imprisonment, can happen "in any country,"98 "in or out of this state," 99 or "within or without this
commonwealth."' Most of the other states are not as liberal.
Those stipulating that the conviction or imprisonment may occur
in any state or federal tribunal 2 would seem to rule out the possibility of basing a divorce suit on criminal offenses committed in a
foreign country. Even more limited are statutes which use the
term "other states" in this regard A If a literal interpretation be
employed, conviction by a federal tribunal or imprisonment in a
federal penal institution would not satisfy.
The majority of the statutes, however, make no provision for
instances where the necessary events take place outside of the
state boundaries. In two of these states it is true that the local
enactment authorizes a divorce where the party has been "sen97 Delaware and Pennsylvania. In the two states which allow divorce for premarital conviction for crime, it makes no difference that the judicial determination
of the spouse's guilt took place in another state or another country: Ariz. Code
Anno. 1939, §27-802(7) ; Mo. Rev. Stat. Anno., § 1514.
98 Burn's Ind. Stat. Anno. 1933, § 3-1201(7).

99 Kentucky and West Virginia.
I Purdon's Penna. Stat. Anno. Tit. 23, § 10.
2 Mass., Minn., N. H.
3 Ala., Colo., Va.
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tenced to imprisonment in any prison, jail, or house of correction. "4 By utilizing the word "any," it would appear that no
specific institution was intended so that sentence to imprisonment
in a penal institution whether within or outside the jurisdiction
would suffice. That word was seized upon as the basis for the
decision in one case, 5 but where the courts have had nothing of
this nature from which to discern the intent of the legislature they
have uniformly held that no divorce may be granted where the
6
conviction or imprisonment took place in another jurisdiction.
Once a legislature has decided that it shall be the policy of the
state to permit a dissolution of a marriage where one spouse has
been convicted of a crime, it is inconsistent, to say the least, to
limit the granting of divorce to those situations where the requisite occurrences take place within the boundaries of the particular
jurisdiction. The shame is not diminished nor the inability to
perform the marital functions lessened where the conviction or
imprisonment occurs in another state. It is suggested, therefore,
that many of the statutes could bear rewriting in this respect.
In a few states an automatic dissolution of the marriage
occurs as soon as there has been the requisite conviction or imprisonment and there is no necessity for resorting to legal
process. 7 That view proceeds on the basis, as at common law, that
the convicted felon is to be regarded as civilly dead for all purposes. In all other jurisdictions, however, a formal divorce is
required.8 As is true of other cases, no divorce proceeding should
Mich., Neb. Italics added.
Long v. Long, 135 Minn. 259, 160 N. W. 687 (1916).
e Leonard v. Leonard, 151 Mass. 151, 23 N. E. 732 (1890) ; Daughdrlll v. Daughdrill, 180 Miss. 589, 178 So. 106 (1938); Martin v. Martin, 47 N. H. 52 (1868);
Klutts v. Klutts, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 423 (1858).
7 Such is the result in Maine. Michigan and New York when the punishment is
life imprisonment. The operation of these statutes Is illustrated by Gargan v.
Scully, 82 Misc. 667, 144 N. Y. S. 205 (1913), and State v. Duket, 90 Wis. 272, 63
N. W. 83 (1895). For the effect upon the property rights of the erring spouse in the
property of the innocent spouse, see Witschi v. Witscht, 261 Mich. 334, 246 N. W.
139 (1933), and In re Lindwall's Will, 287 N. Y. 347, 39 N. E. (2d) 907 (1942).
8 The right to sue a convicted individual for a divorce was upheld in Gray v.
Gray, 104 Mo. App. 520, 79 S. W. 505 (1904), even though it was argued that, under
the law of that state, a convicted individual was considered civilly dead. Only the
Connecticut statute provides for special procedure where divorce is sought on the
ground of conviction for crime.
4
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be instituted until the cause of action has accrued. The elements
leading up to accrual have already been discussed. In addition
thereto, several states make it necessary for the innocent spouse
to wait a specified period before filing the action. 9 This waiting
period is, in all probability, designed to allow the convicted individual time within which to appeal and thereby arrive at a final
determination of his or her guilt. 10 Obviously, if the spouse is not
actually guilty, he or she should not be deprived of marital rights
because of an erroneous conviction. Silence on the part of other
statutes would seem to permit immediate suit, but issues of this
nature may then arise by way of defense.
The defense of a pending appeal from the criminal conviction," for example, has been pleaded in several cases. There has
been a divergence of opinion on this point, one jurisdiction holding that the conviction is not a ground for divorce until it has
12
become final by affirmation or because no appeal has been taken.
New Hampshire, on the other hand, takes the view that the mere
fact that an appeal has been taken from the conviction does not
make it any the less a ground for divorce.' 3 If permanency of
marital relationships is of the utmost importance, no marriage
should be dissolved until all doubt that the conviction will stand
has been removed. Logically, then, if the innocent spouse does not
institute the action for divorce until after the appeal has been
9 In Arizona and in Texas, no suit may be maintained until twelve months after
final judgment has been pronounced in the criminal case.
10 It was urged, in Polson v. Poison. 140 Ind. 310, 39 N. E. 498 (1895), in the
absence of such a provision, that since the defendant had a year in which to appeal
his conviction, the action for divorce could not be maintained until that year had
passed. As other grounds for divorce existed, the court did not consider itself
bound to rule on this contention.
11 There is a conflict of opinion as to the effect of an appeal from a conviction of
crime at least in situations other than divorce. One line of authority holds that the
pending appeal operates to prevent the adjudication of guilt from being considered
a conviction: Card v. Foot, 57 Conn. 427, 18 A. 713 (1889). Other courts have held
that the presence of an appeal does not disturb the convictions: In re Kirby, 10
S. D. 322, 73 N. W. 92 (1897).
12 Rivers v. Rivers, 60 Iowa 378, 14 N. W. 774 (1883) ; Vinsant v. Vinsant, 49
Iowa 639 (1878). The statutes of Arizona, District of Columbia, and Texas specifically make it necessary that the conviction became final before a divorce may be
obtained. It has been held that a conviction is not final if an appeal has been
taken: Ashcraft v. State, 94 P. (2d) 939 (Okla. Crim. App., 1939).
13 Cone v. Cone, 58 N. H. 152 (1877).
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decided and there has been a reversal, divorce should be denied for
14
there is no longer any conviction.
Pardons are occasionally granted, so it is important to determine the effect thereof on this ground for divorce. Obviously,
once a marriage has been dissolved, it should not be reinstated
simply by the granting of a pardon. Several states have specific provisions to this effect 15 but the same result should be obtained even in the absence thereof for any other result would
be socially intolerable. More important, however, is the question as to whether or not the presence of an executive pardon would
be a good defense against a subsequent action for divorce. The
statute of one state answers this question with an emphatic
"No,"' 6 while others provide that it "shall not restore the
conjugal rights.' 1 7 The meaning of this latter phrase is vague,
to say the least. It could be interpreted to mean that once there
is a divorce dissolving any of the conjugal rights, a pardon
should not operate to restore them. But it might be construed
in another way, that is as if the conviction and imprisonment
per se deprived the guilty spouse of marital rights, not to be
restored by a pardon yet permitting the latter to be urged as a
defense should divorce litigation be instituted thereafter. Only
one state makes a pardon a bar to a divorce action,' 8 while one
other makes it a defense if the pardon is granted before actual
incarceration has occurred.' 9 Where the statute is silent, the
decisions are in agreement that a pardon granted prior to or
Luper v. Luper, 61 Ore. 418, 96 P. 1099 (1908).
15 Mass., Mich., Neb., N. Y., Wis., Wyo. In South Dakota, the provision only
pertains to cases where the sentence is to life imprisonment: S. D. Stat. 1939,
§14.0108. For application of this type of provision in states where an automatic
dissolution of marital relations occurs, see Gargan v. Sculley, 82 Misc. 667, 144
N. Y. S. 205 (1913), and State v. Duket, 90 Wis. 272, 63 N. W. 83 (1895).
16 See Ariz. Code Anno. 1939 § 27-802(3). The West Virginia act contains the
following proviso: ". . . no pardon granted to the party so sentenced if suit for
divorce shall have been commenced before the granting of such pardon shall restore
such party to his or her conjugal rights." Inferentially, if the suit should be brought
after the pardon had been granted, the pardon would be a good defense.
17 Minn., Va.
Is Texas. In Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191 (1884), the court held that a commutation of sentence is not the same as a pardon as it merely reduces the punishment
but does not completely withdraw it.
19 Miss. Code Anno. 1942, § 2735 (3rd).
14
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during the pendency of divorce proceedings does not nullify the
ground for divorce. 20 The merit of that rule seems to lie in the
fact that the indignity and disgrace of the conviction is not removed by an executive pardon, in fact that acceptance thereof is
tantamount to an admission of guilt, hence the innocent spouse
2 1
should not be deprived of the right to maintain an action.
Condonation and recrimination being available defenses in
a divorce action, there is nothing to prevent their use in an action to dissolve a marriage on the ground of the conviction of
one of the spouses. One jurisdiction specifically provides that
no divorce will be granted where there has been cohabitation
subsequent to the conviction 22 but, even without such a provision, it would logically follow that a resumption of the marital
relationship after there had been a release from prison should
prevent the maintenance of a divorce action 23 for condonation
would then set in. Insofar as recrimination is concerned, the
problem would be to determine whether or not the spouse seeking the divorce has been guilty of misconduct on the same level
as the person convicted of the crime for some states insist upon
finding varying degrees of culpability between the several causes
for divorce. It goes without saying that, if the plaintiff has also
been convicted of an offense within the statute, this fact should
be a bar to a divorce. 24 The commission of adultery, however,
2
has been regarded as sufficient to bar the suit. 5
One further fact should be noted. Two states require that
a divorce proceeding based upon a criminal conviction must be
20 Wood v. Wood, 135 Ga. 385, 69 S. E. 549 (1910) ; Holloway v. Holloway, 126 Ga.
459, 55 S. E. 191 (1906) ; Davidson v. Davidson, 23 Pa. D. & C. Rep. 578 (1914).
See also Handy v. Handy, 124 Mass. 394 (1878), where it was inferentially held
that pardon did not extinguish the ground.
21 For a discussion of this problem, see 7 Col. L. Rev. 54.
22 Va. Code Anno. 1942, § 5103.
23 Miller v. Miller, 19 Ohio App. 518 (1926). See also Englemann v. Englemann,
1 Pa. Dist. Rep. 387 (1907), where it was held that since there had been no continuance of the marital relation during the time the party was confined in prison,
there had been no condonation even though the wife had used her convict-husband's
money to support herself and had visited him during the period of incarceration.
24 See Studley v. Studley, 129 Neb. 784, 263 N. W. 139 (1935).
25 Handy v. Handy, 124 Mass. 394 (1878). See also Abshire v. Hanke, 119 La.
425, 44 So. 186 (1907) ; J. F. C. v. M. E., His Wife, 6 Rob. 135 (La., 1843).
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instituted within a specified period of time. In Idaho, for instance, the suit must be commenced within one year after pardon
or termination of the sentence. 26 Montana, by contrast, requires
that the suit be instituted within two years after the judgment
and sentence. 27 It is evident, then, that the statute of limitations
may be pleaded as a bar in these states, but the same thing is
no doubt true of other states where a general limitation period or'
the doctrine of laches might well be relied on.
The foregoing resume of existing statutory language on the
point of divorce for commission of crime, when considered in the
light of the slight judicial gloss thereon reveals one thing if nothing else and that is that even this small segment of the law is
not without its complications and its inconsistencies. Perhaps
it is fortunate that relatively few divorces are sought on this
ground as compared with others. Not that the crime rate is
decreasing, for such is far from the case. It may be that the
very complications noted serve as an effective deterrent to more
frequent suits. If so, those who propose the adoption of a uniform divorce measure might well keep in mind the deficiencies
in existing statuto before offering any model law for countrywide adoption.

Ida. Code, Tit. 32, § 615(2).
Mont. Rev. Code Anno. 1935, § 5762(2). The statute of limitations cannot be
waived by the defendant for the divorce suit Involves not only the parties but the
state as well: Franklin v. Franklin, 40 Mont. 348, 106 P. 353 (1910).
26
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EFFECT OF CURATIVE STATUTES ON
TAXATION IN ILLINOIS
J. R. Blomquist*

C

which plague the members of the Illinois General Assembly are so recurrent that their consideration becomes a matter of routine at every session. The legislature hardly
has time to convene before a series of bills are proposed, sponsored by interested municipalities and other taxing bodies, designed to cure defects and errors which have arisen in the process
of levying taxes in the interim between the previous session and
the current one. The constant request for legislative assistance evokes a query as to whether the taxing officials of the
state should not be skilled, by this time, in the processes of taxation so as to be able to avoid such mistakes, but so long as each
session brings statutory modification in the fundamental laws,
and so long as taxing statutes are as complicated as they are,
it is not surprising that errors do creep in. If the taxing machinery were operated by lawyers experienced in detailed statutory requirements, the picture might be different. But many
taxing bodies perform their functions on the basis of information handed down by predecessors in office, often completely ignorant of changes in the taxing laws, hence necessity for the frequent resort to curative statutes in an effort to avoid a complete
breakdown in the sources of revenue.
ERTAIN PROBLEMS

The steps which taxing authorities must follow are hedged
in by statutory requirements and the possibilities for error are
great. When they are multiplied by the thousands of taxing
districts in Illinois, the magnitude of the problems which can
be created is apparent, but attention to a few fundamental facts
will quickly reveal whether pitfalls can be avoided or, if not,
whether the effect of falling therein may be overcome by the
adoption of curative statutes. It should first be noted that authority to levy any tax at all must rest in statutory grant of
* A.B., LL. B. Member, Illinois bar, and faculty of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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power, constitutionally conferred by the legislature on the taxing
body. In the absence thereof, no tax levy could stand. The
municipalities of the state, at least in cases of organized districts having less than 500,000 inhabitants, gain their authority
through certain sections of the Cities and Villages Act. The
first of these specifies that the municipal authorities, within the
first quarter of the fiscal year, shall pass an annual appropriation ordinance in proper form' which shall have been published,
after adoption, in the manner required by law.2 When the total
amount of the annual appropriation has thus been determined,
the municipal authorities are then obliged, on or before the date
prescribed by statute, 3 to adopt a levy ordinance placing the burden of the sums appropriated upon the taxable property in the
municipal area. Certification of these ordinances to the county
officials results, in due time, in the making of assessments and the
issuance of tax bills.
Any failure to follow the general method outlined endangers
the collection of needed revenue and, if deviation occurs at what
may be regarded as jurisdictional points in the process, the tax
levy may be entirely void. If no protest is made, the taxpayer
who has discharged his obligation to his government is prevented
from complaining of any error in the taxing process. It is the
alert taxpayer, however, who will scan the municipal operation
closely and, not infrequently, uncover some defect upon which to
resist collection of the tax imposed. To offset this challenge, or
even the threat thereof, the municipal authorities seek recourse
to the curative statute which the obliging legislature enacts.
The term "curative act" is occasionally used to refer to
statutes designed to have prospective operation, that is to remedy
errors which have not yet occurred and which may arise in the
future. Illinois has long had one statute of that character,4 de1 Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24, § 15--1.
Ibid., Ch. 24, § 10-3.
3 Ibid., Ch. 24, § 16--1.
4 Ibid., Ch. 120, § 177. It is a re-enactment of Section 191a of the Revenue Act
of 1872. A discussion of the scope thereof may be found in a note in 32 Ill. L. Rev.
456.
2
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signed to take care, automatically, of any of the irregularities
to which it may apply. Many defects, merely formal in nature,
constitute no threat to the validity of the taxing procedure because of the presence thereof. Thus this statute, or its predecessor, has been held to legalize an indefinite description of land
or the omission of the words "dollars" and "cents" from the
assessment roll;' the listing of property in the wrong book;6
the failure of a town clerk to certify the levy to the county
clerk at the proper time; 7 the oversight of the assessor to set
down the full value of the property as the assessed value ;" the
assessing of property in the wrong name ;9 or other like defects. 10
In general, however, curative statutes in Illinois have generally been designed to possess retroactive operation, serving to
correct errors, if operating to cure errors at all, that have already
taken place. In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court once said, in
the case of People v. Illinois Central Railroad Company," that
''curative acts do not authorize the doing of anything in the
future, and the very nature of such acts must be and is wholly
retrospective. They relate solely to actions that have been performed and legalize the same. "'12 In the light of that statement,
and bearing in mind that the general curative statute above referred to is designed to deal with defects, errors and other
informalities which do not affect the "substantial justice of the
levy," it is apparent that the term "curative statute," as most
frequently used in Illinois, applies to enactments intended to be
People v. Brown, 261 Il. 73, 103 N. E. 559 (1913).
6 Wabash, St. L. & Pac. R. Co. v. Johnson, 108 Ill. 11 (1883).
7 Thatcher v. People, 79 Ill. 597 (1875).
8 People v. Fleniing, 355 Ill. 91, 188 N. E. 818 (1933).
9 Mich. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Carr, 303 Ill. 354, 135 N. E. 881 (1922); People v.
Illinois Cent. R. Co., 307 I1. 265, 138 N. E. 593 (1923).
10 Eurigh v. People, 79 Ill. 214 (1875).
5

11301 Ill. 288, 133 N. E. 779 (1921).
12 301 Ill. 288 at 297, 133 N. E. 779 at 782. See also People v. Kinsey. 294 Ill. 530,
128 N. E. 561 (1920). In People v. C.. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 305 Ill. 567 at 568, 137
N. E. 392 at 393 (1922), the court said: "The object of a curative act is not to
change the law governing future action, but to waive some requirement of the law
affecting past action."
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retrospective in operation 1 3 and planned to cure those defects
which do affect the "substantial justice" of the tax levy.
Absence of an appropriation ordinance in force at the time
of the levy, for example, could hardly be considered an "error
or informality" within the meaning of the general curative statute 14 and, even if it were, lack of publication thereof could scarcely
be considered aided by the statute for its purports to amend not
to supply original action, without which there is nothing to be
amended. The problem, then, is to ascertain how far the legislature may go in passing curative measures falling within the
second category, that is those enacted after the error of substance has occurred.
The power of a legislature to validate defective tax proceedings by the enactment of retroactive statutes, while universally
recognized, 15 is not without restraint for no statute can stand
which contravenes constitutional limitations. Illinois, in harmony
with other states, will not sanction curative acts which impair
vested rights, as where a taxpayer has changed his position before
attempt has been made to cure the defect, 16 or which purport to
interfere with the proper exercise of the judicial power, as by
seeking to upset a judicial declaration of tax invalidity pro13 Special curative acts have been employed, however, to cure merely formal defects which were probably legalized anyway by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 120, J 717.
See, for example, People v. I. C. R. R. Co., 301 Ill. 288, 133 N. E. 779 (1921), where
a validating act remedied the failure of a school board to return certificates of levy
at a proper time, and People v. Millard, 307 Ill. 556, 139 N. E. 113 (1923), where a
resolution, defective because passed at an improperly called meeting, was validated
by a curative act and the levy was saved.
14 In C. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. People, 193 Ill. 594 at 598, 61 N. E. 1100 at 1101
(1901), the court said: "The substantial justice of a tax is affected if it is one
which the authorities attempting to impose it have no power or right to impose.
Provisions of the statute designed for the protection of the taxpayer are mandatory,
and a disregard of them will render the tax illegal." It therefore held that Section
191a of the Revenue Act of 1872, now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 120, § 717, did not
operate to validate a levy made at a time when the commissioners had no authority.
See also People v. McElroy, 248 Ill. 574, 94 N. E. 81 (1911), where the same section
was held not to save a tax when the appropriation ordinance was not enacted or
published within the first quarter of the fiscal year as required by a statute, the
provisions of which were deemed mandatory.
15 See annotation to People ex rel. Larson v. Thompson, 377 I1. 104, 35 N. E. (2d)
355 (1941), in 140 A. L. R. 959.
16 Conway v. Cable, 37 Ill. 82 (1865).
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nounced before passage of the statute 7 To permit statutes of
that character to stand would be to deprive the taxpayer of property without due process of law. In addition to such general prohibitions, the Illinois Constitution of 1870 contains a restraint,
not frequently found elsewhere, prohibiting the legislature from
imposing taxes on the municipality or its inhabitants for corporate
purposes.' 8 This limitation, at times, has been found to serve
as a basis for declaring curative acts ineffective' but upon reasoning which has been limited to this state and which has not
20
found favor elsewhere.
So long as no constitutional prohibition is invaded, the Illinois Supreme Court has been willing to recognize that the legislature may, by curative act, validate any proceeding which it might
have authorized in advance. 2 1 While this principle has been stated
rather frequently, it should not be accepted entirely at its face
value for it would seem to indicate that the legislature has the
power to waive any procedural requirement, at some future time,
since almost all the taxing procedure is prescribed by the legislature. A succession of cases, however, has served to prove that
the legislature has no such sweeping power for it has been denied the right to provide a cure where there was (1) a funda17 See C. & E. I. R. R. Co. v. People, 219 Ill. 408, 76 N. E. 571 (1905). where it
was held that, after a decision invalidating a tax for failure to itemize its purposes,
the legislature had no power to cure the defect.
's Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IX, § 10.
19 See cases listed in note 29, post.
20 In a note in 32 Ill. L. Rev. 456, at 471, it is stated that, of nine states having
constitutional provisions similar to that in Illinois, in two such states where the
question arose the Illinois interpretation was rejected. Curative acts were there
regarded not to amouzt to an "imposition" of a tax by the legislature contrary to
constitutional prohibition: Weber v. City of Helena, 89 Mont. 109, 297 P. 455
(1931) ; Owings v. City of Olympia, 88 Wash. 289, 152 P. 1019 (1915).
Cooley, Const.
21 See Owens v. Green, 400 Ill. 380, 81 N. E. (2d) 149 (1948).
Lim., 8th Ed., p. 775, states: "If the thing wanting, or which failed to be done,
and which constitutes the defect in the proceedings is something the necessity for
which the legislature might have dispensed with by prior statute, then it is not
beyond the power of the legislature to dispense with it by subsequent statute.
And if the irregularity consists in doing some act, or in the mode or manner of
doing some act, which the legislature might have made immaterial by prior law,
it is equally competent to make the same immaterial by a subsequent law." The
latter sentence comes close to statements of the Illinois Supreme Court which
emphasize that the defect is curable if it relates to a mere immaterial irregularity,
a formal defect, or one not necessary to the exercise of the power. See cases cited
in notes 37 to 41 inclusive, post.
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mental lack of power to act, 22 (2) where there was no jurisdic24
tion to tax,23 or (3) where the entire tax proceeding was void.
It is not too clear how the court could distinguish between these
three situations, but the conclusion is apparent from the holdings that almost all of the attempts to cure what might be regarded as defects of a serious nature and which might come under
one or more of these heads have been ineffective.
By way of illustration, one need consider only a few of the
decisions on the subject. In the case of People ex rel. Ward v.
Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railway Company,2 5 for example, the
board of supervisors had levied a tax, on December 12, 1934, for
Vermillion County although the statute required that the tax
levy should be made prior to December 1st. The legislature,
by an act approved on January 17, 1935, purported to grant to
such county boards as had omitted to levy by the proper date the
authority to make another levy 26 while also providing, through
another statute, that levies made after the first day of December
were valid. 2 7 The court held the curative act void, stating at
the time
The legislature may by statute validate the irregular or defective exercise of a power where the power already existed
and the proceeding sought 'to be cured was not one of the
fundamentals of the power exercised. However, the General
Assembly cannot give validity to the exercise of a power
where such assumed power did not exist at the time it was
purported to have been exercised. The power to levy a tax
22 People v. Thompson, 377 Il.
104, 35 N. E. (2d) 355 (1941) ; People v. Baum,
367 Ill. 249, 11 N. E. (2d) 373 (1937): People v. C. & E. I. Ry. Co., 365 Ill. 202,
6 N. E. (2d) 119 (1936); People v. Public Service Co., 328 Ill. 440, 159 N. E.
797 (1928) ; People v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 310 Ill. 428, 141 N. E. 827 (1923);
People v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 310 Ill. 212, 141 N. E. 822 (1923).
23 People v. C. & E. I. Ry. Co., 365 Ill. 202, 6 N. E. (2d) 119 (1936).
24 People v. Dearborn St. Bldg. Corp.. 372 Ill. 459, 24 N. E. (2d) 373 (1939)
People v. Southern ny. Co., 367 Ill. 389. 11 N. E. (2d) 602 (1937) : People v.
Wabash Ry. Co., 360 Ill. 173, 195 N. E. 665 (1935) ; People v. Bell, 309 Ill. 387,
141 N. E. 187 (1923); People v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 321 Ill. 499, 152 N. E.
560 (1926).
25 365 Ill. 202, 6 N. E. (2d) 119 (1937).
26 Laws 1935, p. 685: H. B. No. 5.
27 Ibid., p. 685; H. B. No. 4.
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by an administrative body is jurisdictional. Jurisdiction to
act cannot be conferred by subsequent legislative acts where
the assumed power to act was lacking at the time the pur28
ported proceeding was had.
It also found that the attempted validation fell afoul of the constitutional restraint aforementioned in that the result, if upheld, would amount to the legislative imposition of a tax for
corporate purposes. 9
It may be noted that the court, when speaking of the "power
to levy," was not referring to an actual lack of authority on the
part of the board of supervisors for it is plain that the taxing
function had been validly delegated to that body. What happened in the case might more nearly be described as a defect
in procedure in the carrying out of that power. Such defects,
however, are not uncommonly referred to by the court as illustrating a "lack of power to act." In this respect, one should
bear in mind that the phrase "lack of power" possesses a different significance and has a contrasting meaning with the same
phrase when used in other municipal affairs for it then refers
to a complete absence of grant of authority from the legislature to the municipal corporation to indulge in the given activity.
In another case, that of People ex rel. Larson v. Thompson,"0
a forest preserve district passed an appropriation ordinance on
July 18, 1939, but failed to publish the same until the following
September 8th. The levy ordinance was passed on September
15th. The law required publication of the appropriation ordinance within ten days after its passage but declared that the
ordinance provisions should not become effective until ten days
28365 Ill. 202 at 207, 6 N. E. (2d) 119 at 122.
29 See also People v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 375 Ill. 85, 30 N. E. (2d) 739
(1940) ; People v. Orvis, 374 Ill. 536, 30 N. E. (2d) 28 (1940) ; People v. C. & E. I.
Ry. Co., 343 Ill. 101, 175 N. E. 4 (1931); People v. Public Service Co., 328 Ill.
440, 159 N. E. 797 (1928); People v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 321 Ill. 499, 152
N. E. 560 (1926) ; People v. E., I. & St. L. Ry. Co.. 312 Ill. 134, 143 N. E. 431

(1924); People v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co, 310 Ill. 212, 141 N. E. 822 (1923).
All
cases listed in notes 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and this one were cases which decided that
curative acts were incapable of validating defective levies.
30377 Ill. 104, 35 N. E.

(2d) 355 (1941).
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after publication. 3 1 Again the legislature enacted a curative
statute clearly intended to fit the case for it specified that such
levies were valid "notwithstanding that the publication of the
appropriation ordinance occurred more than ten days after its
passage and notwithstanding that the tax levy ordinance was
passed within ten days after the publication of the appropriation ordinance." '32 The court accepted the contention that the
requirement for publication within ten days after passage was
a directory one only, except that the appropriation measure could
not become effective until ten days after its eventual publication.
But it went on to find that the levy was void because passed at a
time when no enforcible appropriation ordinance existed. That
position was achieved by virtue of the fact that the appropriation
ordinance was considered not legal until September 18th, or
three days after the purported levy had been made. 83 The court
again adverted to the proposition that the district was absolutely without authority under the circumstances and reiterated
that no validating act could cure a "lack of authority to act at
all." ' 34 In effect, it accused the legislature of attempting to
confer the power to levy posthumously as well as of violating the
85
state constitution.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 57%, § 12.
IlL Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 57%, § 15d.
33 In People v. Wabash Ry. Co., 360 Ill. 173, 195 N. E. 665 (1935), the court
held that a tax levy ordinance was void because not passed at a time when there
was a valid appropriation ordinance in force, since both ordinances were passed
by the village board at the same meeting, and the appropriation ordinance would
not be in force until 10 days after its publication. Accord: People v. C., C. C. &
St. L. Ry. Co., 281 Ill. 152, 118 N. E. 1 (1917); People v. P. D. & E. R. R. Co., 116
Ill. 410, 6 N. E. 459 (1886). A levy has been declared void, even when made after
the appropriation ordinance, if the latter has not been published as required by
statute, the publication being in a foreign language newspaper: People v. Day, 277
So a tax levy ordinance passed before the approIll. 543, 115 N. E. 732 (1917).
priation ordinance has been published is clearly void: People v. Florville, 207 Ill.
79, 69 N. E. 623 (1903). Where the appropriation ordinance is published the day
after the levy ordinance Is passed, the levy is void for lack of a valid appropriation ordinance: People v. Wabash R. R. Co., 387 Ill. 450, 56 N. E. (2d) 820 (1944).
See also People v. I. C. R. R. Co., 396 Ill. 200, 71 N. E. (2d) 39 (1947).
34 377 Ill. 104 at 113, 35 N. E. (2d) 355 at 359. It might be questioned whether
this situation is one where the phrase "lack of authority to act at all" is technically
Iowever, levies have been uniformly held void for that reason, apaccurate.
parently on the reasoning that the power to levy is not conferred on the taxing
body until it has first properly passed and published an appropriation ordinance.
35 See also People v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 310 Ill. 212, 141 N. E. 822 (1923),
holding the curative act of May 31, 1923, Laws 1923, p. 566, Incapable of validating
31

32
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Logically, the constitutional argument should be the real
basis for the decision so long as the court adheres to the interpretation it has placed on Article IX, Section 2 of the state constitution. But, for some reason, the court prefers to find the
curative act invalid because of the general principle that curative acts are inherently incapable of supplying a missing power
and then links up that conclusion with the constitutional issue.
The former rests upon a void proceeding for its force. The
latter more nearly turns on a "lack of power" or, what sometimes seems to be the equivalent in this regard, a "lack of jurisdiction" to tax.
In contrast, there have been cases in which curative acts
have been upheld on the rationale that the error corrected was
over a matter which the legislature "might have dispensed with
in the first place." 36 Thus insufficient itemization3 7 or failure
to itemize the particular purpose of the tax levy at all 8 may
be validated; defects produced by the fact that the tax was levied
at an unauthorized meeting have been cured;39 uncertainties in
the statement of purpose for the levy have been rectified ;40 and
defective schedules of claims have been remedied. 41 The superficial explanation for such results may rest in an expression of
the court, to be found in the case of People ex rel. Pearsall v.
The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company,42 to the
effect that the legislative power "to validate by curative law any
a tax levy made without first obtaining written consents of the town auditor at a
proper meeting as required by statute. The act was found to violate Ill. Const.
1870, Art. IX, § 10.
36 See note 21, ante.
37 A curative act validated the tax levy in People v. Mercil & Sons Co., 378 Il1.
142, 37 N. E. (2d) 839 (1941), where insufficient itemization had occurred, since
this was regarded merely as a defective exercise of a power existing in the city.
38 Failure to itemize does not go to the fundamental right to levy, so this defect
may be validated according to People v. C., M. & St. P. R. R. Co., 324 I1. 43, 154
N. E. 472 (1926). Accord: People v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 323 Ill.536, 154 N. E.
468 (1926); Bowyer v. People, 220 Ill.93, 77 N. E. 91 (1906); People v. Wis.
Central R. R. Co., 219 Ill. 94, 76 N. E. 80 (1905).
39 People v. Millard, 307 Ill. 556, 139 N. E. 113 (1923).
40 People v. Hamilton, 373 Ill. 124, 25 N. E. (2d) 517 (1940).
41 People v. Southern Ry. Co., 367 Ill. 389, 11 N. E. (2d) 602 (1937).
42310 Ill. 428, 141 N. E. 827 (1923).
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proceeding which it might have authorized in advance is limited
43
to the case of irregular exercise of power."
Reference to "irregular exercise of power," just as is true
with the phrase that the legislature may cure that which it "might
have dispensed with in the first place," is essentially meaningless
in describing the errors which may be cured for there are few
requirements which the legislature could not have dispensed with
had it chosen, while "irregular exercise" includes practically
anything which a taxing body could do in the wrong, as well as
the right, way. But even if the expressions be faulty, the idea
that things not necessary to the exercise of the power may be
waived is a valuable one to be set in contrast with the other
concept that "lack of jurisdiction" may not be overcome.
Aside from having cured occasional minor defects of the kind
above referred to, curative acts have met with little success in
Illinois. Errors in proceedings which affect the substantial justice of the tax 44 have generally been held incurable by validating statutes and, in some cases, the validating statutes themselves
have been held unconstitutional. 45 Other cases have resulted in
declarations by the court that it would not assume that the legislature had attempted to do that which it had no authority to do,
so no effort was made to apply the curative act to the invalid
proceeding it was designed to correct. 46 Taxes levied at an un43 310 Iii. 428 at 429, 141 N. E. 827 at 828.
44 See note 14, ante. A failure to itemize is more than an irregularity which
may be overlooked under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 120, § 717, but is such an irregularity that may be cured by a validating act "because the legislature might
have dispensed with the requirement in the first place." This defect has been
held not to go to the power to levy, even though it did affect the substantial
justice thereof, in People v. C., M. & St. P. R. R. Co., 324 Ill. 43, 154 N. E.
472 (1926).
45 See People v. C. & E. I. Ry. Co., 312 Ill. 216, 143 N. E. 464 (1924) ; People v.
T., St. L. & W. R. R. Co., 312 Ill. 201, 143 N. E. 417 (1924); People v. E. I. &
St. L. Ry. Co., 312 Ill. 134, 143 N. E. 431 (1924); People v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co.,
312 Ill. 58, 143 N. E. 460 (1924); People v. Wabash Ry. Co., 311 Ill. 579, 143
N. E. 488 (1924) ; People v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 311 Ill. 113, 142 N. E. 473 (1924) ;
People v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 310 Ill. 428, 141 N. E. 827 (1923) ; People v.
Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 310 Ill.
212, 141 N. E. 822 (1923).
These cases all hold unconstitutional the act of May 31, 1923, purporting to validate an additional tax levy
made without the consent of the town auditors.
46 People v. Dearborn St. Bldg. Corp., 372 Ill. 459, 24 N. E. (2d) 373 (1939);
People v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 310 Ill.
495, 142 N. E. 176 (1924).
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authorized excess rate have failed for want of an efficient cure. 47
The failure to obtain written consents of town auditors at proper
meetings, as required by statute, has not been remedied by
validating statute. 48 A bond issue, void because approved by
voters at an election called on improper notice, has likewise failed
despite legislative attempts to validate. 49 For that matter, an
attempt to make valid a bond issue, where the petition requesting
the election on the proposition did not contain a sufficient number of signatures, has been turned down even though a majority
of the voters at the election had favored the issue. 50 Certainly,
then, where there is no valid organization of the taxing district,
any attempt to validate the levy of such an organization would
necessarily fail, for the power to tax never existed. 5 1
It is apparent, then, that the Illinois Supreme Court has taken
a dim view of attempts by the legislature to counteract the mistakes and omissions of the taxing authorities. It is somewhat
difficult to see upon what principle of justice a person may be
allowed to avoid his obligation to contribute to the support of
his local governmental unit merely because of oversight, accident,
or technical error on the part of the taxing officials. Rarely is
there a question of vested interests presented but, so long as the
court pursues its former views, those who object are relieved
of the tax burden while others, who do not, suffer added injury
by being forced, in subsequent years, to make up for the taxes
lost to the successful objector.
There may be occasion to hope, however, that the court might
change its views on the subject of the validity of curative stat47 The curative act of June 26, 1923, Laws 1923, p. 265, could not validate a tax
levied at an unauthorized excess rate since doing so would violate Ill. Const.
1870, Art. IX, § 10, according to People v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 310 Ill. 212, 141
N. R. 822 (1923). Accord: People v. Baum, 367 Ill. 249, 11 N. E. (2d) 373 (1937).
48 See note 35, ante.
49 People v. Ervin, 375 Ill. 435, 31 N. E. (2d) 789 (1940).
50 See People v. Riche, 396 Ill. 85, 71 N. E. (2d) 332 (1947) ; People v. Miller,
392 Ill. 445, 64 N. E. (2d) 869 (1946); People v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co.. 391 Ill.
145, 62 N. E. (2d) 460 (1945); People v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 385 Ill. 86, 52
N. E. (2d) 255 (1944); People v. C. G. W. R. R. Co., 379 Ill. 594, 41 N. E. (2d)
960 (1942) ; People v. Thompson, 377 Ill. 244, 36 N. E. (2d) 351 (1941).
51 Mauldlng v. Skillet Fork Drain. Dist., 313 Ill. 216, 145 N. E. 227 (1924).
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utes. As late as 1948, in the case of Owen v. Green,52 the Supreme Court made a statement which may recast the whole theory
of curative acts into a single formula. It there said
Where there is no constitutional prohibition, the legislature
may, by curative act, validate any proceeding which it might
have authorized in advance. The principal, if not the only,
exception to legislative power to ratify . . . is in tax levy
cases where section 10, article IX of the Constitution pre53
cludes the enactment of a curative act.
If that formula is followed, tax cases need not be complicated
in the future, as has been the case in the past, by distorted attempts to rationalize a result inconsistent with the general rule
governing the validity of curative statutes.
It is possible, in the not too distant future, that there may
be occasion for the court to give substance to that formula if it
feels so inclined for a serious problem looms over the revenues
of many of the taxing units of the state. The problem grows
out of the fact that, in 1947, the legislature amended Section
10-3 of the Cities and Villages Act. Prior to amendment, the
statute required that all ordinances designed to impose any fine,
penalty, imprisonment, or forfeiture, as well as those which made
any appropriation, should be printed in book or pamphlet form
by the corporate authorities or they should be published at least
once in a newspaper published in the city or village, or should
be posted, if no newspaper was published therein, all within one
month after passage. 54 Emphasis is given to the word "or"
since the law then clearly contemplated alternative forms for
giving notoriety to the intended ordinance. By the amendment
adopted in 1947, publication was permitted in any newspaper
of general circulation distributed in the municipality even though
not published therein, but posting was permitted in municipalities having less than 500 population. The period for publica52 400 Ill. 380, 81 N. E. (2d) 149 (1948).
53 400 Il. 380 at 403-4, 81 N. E. (2d) 149 at 162.
54 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 24, § 10-3.
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tion was also shortened from one month to ten days,5" so as to
conform the publication period to that found in other statutes
regulating certain particular governmental units.5 6 But, whether
intentionally or not, the amended statute, as passed, contained
the word "and" where previously had appeared the word "or,"
so that ordinances of the type mentioned, after 1947, should be
both printed in pamphlet form and be published in the manner
indicated.
Judging by the haste with which the legislature acted at its
last session, many taxing authorities in the state must have
failed to notice the minute but tremendously significant change
thus caused. It can only be supposed that substantial amounts of
revenue must have been in jeopardy, for the legislature not only
recast Section 10-3 of the Cities and Villages Act, replacing
"and" with "or" and making the amendment an emergency
measure, 57 but also tried to fill the breach with a curative statute
designed to validate all appropriation and levy ordinances passed
in the interim between the 1947 and the 1949 sessions.5 8 In general, the curative act purports to make valid not only all. taxes
levied despite failure to publish in the form required but also
those where publication of the annual appropriation ordinance
preceded the levy ordinance by only ten days. The problem, of
course, is whether this curative act, resembling other statutes
of the past, will prove to resemble them also in failing to provide
the hoped-for solution.
If the present court, when faced with tax objections based
upon municipal failure to comply with the requirements of Section 10-3 of the Cities and Villages Act as it stood before its
55 IMI. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24, § 10-3.
56 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 57Y2 , § 12.
57 Laws 1949, p. -:
H. B. No. 49, §1. See also Smith-Hurd Stats. Ann., cum.
supp. June 1949, p. 44. Section 2 thereof states that whereas, "in order to prevent
an unnecessary and great expense and a serious embarrassment in the administration of municipal affairs, cities and villages must be immediately relieved of the
requirement heretofore existing that certain ordinances be published both in
book or pamphlet form and in certain newspapers, an emergency exists and this
act shall take effect upon its becoming a law." The phrasing conceals, but still
suggests, the thought that duplicate publication was probably not intentionally
imposed on municipalities.
58 Laws 1949, p. -:
H. B. No. 623, §§ 1 and 2. See also Smith-Hurd Stats. Ann.,
cum. supp. June 1949, p. 57; Ch. 24, §§ 697e2 and 697e3.
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recent re-amendment, follows in the footsteps of its predecessors
it can only conclude that the curative act is a nullity. Reference
need only be made to the case of People ex rel. Larson v. Thompson-" to sustain that conclusion, for it was there held that a curative measure designed to validate both an appropriation ordinance, void for want of publication at the proper time, and the
ensuing levy ordinance, void because not preceded by a valid
appropriation ordinance, was totally ineffective to cure either. If
further ammunition is needed, reference to the decisions previously noted on the inability of the legislature to retroactively
confer the power to levy a tax should be all that should be necessary. The prospects of success for the measure in question are,
therefore, quite dim.
But the opportunity will no doubt be presented for the court
to strike out afresh on the subject if it so wishes. It may elect
to confirm the formula of Owen v. Green6" and conclude that there
is no constitutional restraint upon a measure of this kind. It may
rationalize that "and" means "or," and vice versa, when the
subject warrants it. It may realize the governmental necessity
for revenue as well as the calamity which could ensue from a
wholesale deprival of taxes,6 ' and produce a decision not in keeping with those cited. There is reason to believe, however, that
it should re-interpret the Illinois Constitution in this respect
to find, as have other courts, 6 2 that there is no constitutional vice
in curative statutes remedying defects in taxation in the absence
of a clear-cut deprivation of property without due process of law.
59377 Ill. 104, 35 N. E. (2d) 227 (1941).
60400 Ill. 380, 81 N. E. (2d) 149 (1948).
61 When a defect threatened to invalidate a great number of tax proceedings in
Illinois on a prior occasion, the abstract principle of limitation on the scope
of curative statutes was overcome by such necessity: People v. N. Y. Central R. R.
Co., 282 Ill. 11, 118 N. E. 462 (1917). A statute providing for the organization of
school districts was there held unconstitutional but the validating statute was
allowed to stand. The defect certainly went to the jurisdiction of the taxing body
to act at all. Other cases involving the same statute are People v. Kessler, 282 Ill.
16, 118 N. E. 493 (1917) ; People v. Leigh, 282 Ill. 17, 118 N. E. 495 (1917) ; People
v. New York C. R. R. Co., 282 Ill. 19, 118
EN.
. 481 (1917) ; People v. Matthews,
282 Ill. 85, 118 N. E. 481 (1917) ; People v. K. & S. R. Co., 282 Ill. 541, 118 N. E.
753 (1918) ; People v. P., C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 284 Ill. 87, 119 N. E. 914 (1918) ;
People v. C. & A. R. R. Co., 285 Ill. 232, 120 N. E. 454 (1918).
Three justices
dissented in the Matthews case on the ground that the curative act violated the
state constitution.
62 For related cases from other jurisdictions, see annotation in 140 A. L. R. 959.
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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
AUTOMOBILES--INJuRIES FROM OPERATION, OR USE OF HIGHWAYWHETHER OR NOT OWNER OP PARKED AUTOMOBILE WHO LEAVES KEY IN
IGNITION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INJURIES INFLICTED BY THIEF WHO STEALS
CAR-Judicial speculation on the purpose and intent of the legislature
when enacting Section 189(a) of the Motor Vehicle Act became apparent
in the case of Ostergard v. Frisch,' a case of far-reaching importance to
car owners in Illinois.
1333 Il.
opinion.

The defendant automobile owner there concerned

App. 359, 77 N. E. (2d) 537 (1948).

Niemeyer, P. J., wrote a dissenting
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left his car standing unattended on a Chicago street with the motor off
but with the key left in the ignition, thereby violating the statute aforementioned. 2 A thief drove off with the car, collided with and damaged
plaintiff's parked automobile, and the Municipal Court of Chicago, sitting
without a jury, rendered judgment against the defendant for the damage
done. That judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First
District, despite a dissenting opinion, on the ground that, in determining
whether the negligence involved in a violation of the statute was the
proximate cause of the resulting injury, the statute might, by its obvious
intent, "enlarge upon the general definition of proximate cause."3
Through the years, the courts have been called upon to decide the
broad general question of whether a violation of a statute should serve to
impose civil liability,4 but the law on this subject is in a state of uncertainty and the decisions are no models either of logic or consistency.
One group of cases holds that every violation of a statute is negligence
per se but that whether or not such negligence is the proximate cause of
the injury should be a jury question. 5 Another group of cases, agreeing
that a violation of a statute is negligence per se, nevertheless holds that,
as a matter of law, the intervening act of an intermeddler, not the original
negligence of the party violating the statute, is to be regarded as the
proximate cause of any subsequent injury." On the specific point, the
increase in recent years of statutes and ordinances requiring that cars
left standing unattended on public streets should be locked has come to
be an important factor. Several states have statutes identical with or
2111.

Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95 , §§ 189(a) and 118.

3 333 Ill. App. 359 at 369, 77 N. E. (2d) 537 at 541. The minority opinion adhered to the time-honored rule of law that the causal connection between a person's negligence and an injury is broken by the intervention of a willful, malicious
and criminal act of a third person, unless there are special circumstances which
will render the defendant liable on the theory that the intervening cause was
reasonably foreseeable.
4 Atkinson v. The Newcastle and Gateshead Waterworks Co., L. R. 2 Exch. Div.
441 (1877) and L. R. 6 Ex. 404 (1878) ; Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & Bl. 402, 118 Eng.
Rep. 1193 (1854).
5 Moran v. Borden Co., 309 Ill. App. 391, 33 N. E. (2d) 166 (1941) ; Malloy v.
Newman, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N. E. (2d) 1001 (1941) ; Garis v. Eberling, 18 Tenn.
App. 1, 71 S. W. (2d) 215 (1934). But see contra, Galbraith v. Levin, - Mass. -,
81 N. E. (2d) 560 (1948).
6 Squires v. Brooks, 44 App. D. C. 320 (1916), overruled by Ross v. Hartman,
78 App. D. C. 217, 139 F. (2d) 14 (1943) ; Galbraith v. Levin, - Mass. -, 81 N. E.
(2d) 560 (1948); Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N. E. (2d) 330 (1945);
Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N. E. 778 (1927) ; Roberts v. Lundy,
301 Mich. 726, 4 N. W. (2d) 74 (1942); Kennedy v. Hedberg, 159 Minn. 76,
198 N. W. 302 (1924) ; Rhad v. Duquesne Light Co., 255 Pa. 409, 100 A. 262 (1917).
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very similar to the Illinois provision construed in the instant case 7 and,
where these statutes have been involved, some decisions to date line up
with the minority holding therein 8 but there has been a strong tendency
to hold as did the majority of the court.9
In situations of this kind, three fundamental inquiries immediately
arise, namely: (1) did the defendant violate the statute; (2) what were
the facts concerning the plaintiff's injury; and (3) was plaintiff's injury
of the type which the statute was intended to prevent? The first two are
fact questions, but the third generates a question of law which embraces
and, in effect, actually eliminates the troublesome and confusing consideration of proximate causation.' 0 It necessarily requires a construction of the
statute, which may be construed as if it were intended to protect all
persons or as if designed to protect a particular class of persons against
a more or less narrowly restricted type of hazard. If the former, the
violator is more or less automatically liable upon a showing of violation.
Under the latter view, the offender cannot be civilly liable unless the
injury which results to the other is caused by his exposure to the particular hazard from which it was the design of the statute to protect him."
Canons of construction require that a statute should be interpreted with
reference to the principles of common law in force at the time of its
passage and, to arrive at sound interpretation, the search should be guided
by four cardinal points of orientation, to-wit: (1) what was the common
law before the passage of the act; (2) what was the hazard against which
the common law did not provide; (3) what remedy did the legislature
intend to provide to cure the hazard; and (4) what was the true purpose
12
of the law?
As to the first of these, it was not unlawful at common law to park a
car unattended, to leave the key in the ignition, to keep the motor running,
or to fail to set the brakes and turn the wheels to the curb when on a
7 Colo. Stats. 1935, Ch. 16, § 232; Burns' Ind. Stats. Ann., Vol. 8, p. 879, § 47-2124;
Kans. Rev. Stats. 1942, § 189.430; Md. Code 1943, Art. 66%, § 192; Mass. Gen.
Laws 1932, Ch. 90, §§ 7 and 13; Miss. Stats., § 8219; N. H. Rev. Laws 1942, Ch.
119, § 24; R. I. Gen. Laws, Ch. 88, § 15; Utah Code Ann. 1942, Tit. 57, Ch. 7, § 169;
Wyo. Rev. Stats. 1945, Ch. 60, § 530. See also D. of C. Traffic Reg., § 58.
8 Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N. E. (2d) 330 (1945); Slater v. T. C.
Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N. E. 778 (1927).
9 Ross v. Hartman, 78 App. D. C. 217, 139 F. (2d) 14 (1943), cert. den. 321
U. S. 790, 64 S. Ct. 790, 88 L. Ed. 1080 (1943), reversing Squires v. Brooks, 44
App. D. C. 320 (1916).
See also Bullock v. Dahlstrom, 46 A. (2d) 370 (D. C.,
1946).
10 Venable, "Proximate Causes and Effects," 19 Miss. L. J. 183 (1948) ; Lowndes,
"Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation," 16 Minn. L. Rev. 361 (1932).
"Restatement, Torts, § 286(h).
12 Potter's Dwaris on Statutes (1871), p. 184.
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perceptible grade. Any of these things might or might not have been
regarded as actionable negligence, depending upon how a jury decided
the question of proximate causation, but they were not negligent acts as a
matter of law nor were they offenses against the state. A motor vehicle
was not regarded as a dangerous instrumentality but more nearly analogous
to a horse and wagon, 13 so the operator was under a duty to exercise only
such care as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under the
circumstances. 1 4 Leaving a car or horse unattended, unlocked or unfastened on a public street was not ipso facto negligence 15 although, with
added circumstances, it might be so considered 16 particularly if a prudent
man would have reasonably foreseen that injury might result.
What, then, was the hazard against which the common law did not
provide? Clearly it failed to provide adequate measures to lessen the
danger to the public from runaway horses or runaway cars in those cases
where no fault attended upon the leaving thereof unguarded. By declaring it to be a misdemeanor to park a car with the motor running, or with
the key in the ignition, or without bracing the wheels on a hill, the state
could, under its police power, materially lessen the hazard to the public
from runaway cars, without at the same time increasing the car owner's
civil responsibilities on common law principles. 1 7 The common law already
provided sufficient protection against the hazard of having a parked car
set in motion by the intervention of children, for the courts were ready
to hold the car owner liable where the intervening efficient cause of the
injury was such as he could reasonably have anticipated.18 But, to be
reasonably foreseeable, the act of the intermeddler should be a normal
response to the situation created by the defendant's negligence. Theft of
a parked automobile, made easy because the key is in the ignition, is not a
normal response but is, rather, the willful, malicious or criminal act of
13 Maloney v. Kaplan, 233 N. Y. 426, 135 N. E. 838 (1922); Vincent v. Crandall
& Godley Co., 115 N. Y. S. 600 (1909).
14 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles, § 338.
15 Castay v. Katz & Bestoff, 148 So. 76 (La. App. 1933); Roberts v. Lundy,
301 Mich. 726, 4 N. W. (2d) 74 (1942); Jackson v. Mills-Fox Baking Co., 221
Mich. 64, 190 N. W. 740, 26 A. L. R. 906 (1922) ; Wilson v. Harrington, 269 App.
Div. 891, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 157 (1945), affirmed in 295 N. Y. 667, 65 N. E. (2d)
101 (1946); Walter v. Bond, 267 App. Div. 779, 45 N. Y. S. (2d) 379 (1943);
Kaplan v. Shults Bread Co., 208 N. Y. S. 118 (1925) ; Maloney v. Kaplan, 233
N. Y. 426, 135 N. E. 838 (1922) ; Frashella v. Taylor, 157 N. Y. S. 881 (1916);
Rapczynski v. W. T. Cowan, Inc., 138 Pa. Super. 392, 10 A. (2d) 810 (1940).
16 Tomano v. Ideal Towel Supply Co., - N. J. -,
51 A. (2d) 888 (1947);
Connell v. Berland, 223 App. Div. 234, 228 N. Y. S. 20 (1928) ; Gumbrell v. Clausen
Flanagan Brewery, 199 App. Div. 778, 192 N. Y. S. 451 (1922) ; Campbell v. Model
Steam Laundry, 190 N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1925).
17 Thayer, "Public Wrong and Private Action," 27 Harv. L. Rev. 317 (1914).
18 Neering v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 383 Ill. 381, 50 N. E. (2d) 497 (1943). The
case of Moran v. Borden Co., 309 Ill. App. 391, 33 N. E. (2d) 166 (1941), could
well be said to rest on common law doctrines.
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anvther for which the common law relieved the party guilty of mere
passive negligence from liability. That fact, then, might have been within
the cognizance of the legislature when it acted. But is it not more reasonable to suppose it was the first defect at which the statute was aimed
rather than the second, i.e. the hazard of a parked car being stolen and
driven negligently by the thief? To read into the statute a presumption
that the owner impliedly consented to the use of his car by a thief or other
unauthorized person would be clearly unconstitutional, even if the courts
should be permitted to so liberally construe a statute in derogation of the
common law when no such intent is to be found in its language.
What remedy did the legislature provide designed to cure the hazard?
The provision in question is part of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic
on Highways. 19 The whole act was designed to regulate traffic and the
language thereof is free from ambiguity. Under the general purpose of
regulating traffic in the interest of public safety, and for the obvious
specific purpose of lessening the danger that parked cars might be set in
motion without the intervention of human agency, the legislature, pursuant to its police power, set out such precautions as would guard against
runaway cars. The engine should be stopped because a shove from some
direction might start the vehicle up under its own power. The ignition
should be locked and the key removed because a shove might move the
key, unlock the ignition and start the car. The brakes should be set and
the wheels turned to the curb when parking on a grade, because the force
of gravity or a shove might start the driverless car on a terror-laden frolic
of its own. To lessen these dangers, the legislature ordered that drivers
should abide by the regulations set forth, under penalty of being guilty
of a misdemeanor. Just that, and nothing more, can be found in the
words of the legislative command.
What, then, was the true purpose of the statute? Simply stated, it
was to regulate traffic. If the purpose had been to prevent theft, the
statute would have required, in addition, that the car doors be locked and
all windows be shut tight. Provision for the setting of brakes would then
have been entirely out of place. It therefore seems clear, without the need
for unnecessary speculation, that the purpose of Section 189 (a) was merely
to prevent injuries apt to be caused by runaway cars. If the statute had
been construed and applied as it would seem to have been intended, that
is to protect the public against a narrowly restricted type of hazard, the
defendant in the instant case would not have been held civilly liable for
his violation thereof. To hold otherwise exposes the majority of the court
to the charge of making an nnjust enlargement upon both the legislative
language and purpose.
GRAcE THOMAS STRIPLING

19 111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95 %, § 98 et seq.
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AUTOMOBILES-INJURIES

FROM

OPERATION,

OR USE

OF

HIGHWAYS-

WHETHER SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF PROCESS AGAINST NONRESIDENT AUTOIST
SHOULD BE LIMITED TO ACTIONS BASED ON ACCIDENTS OCCURRING ON PUBLIC

HIGHWAYS--In the recent case of 0'Sullivan v. Brown,' the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was confronted with the problem of
2
determining whether or not the nonresident motorist statute of Texas
was applicable to an accident which occurred on a road within premises
owned by the United States Government but leased by it to a manufacturing corporation to be used as an airplane plant. The defendant was a
resident of Illinois and service of process was had upon him in the
statutory fashion. Defendant moved to quash the service and to dismiss
the action on the ground of want of jurisdiction, contending that the
road upon which the accident occurred was not a public highway within
the meaning of that term as used in the statute. It was shown that the
premises were entirely surrounded by a fence, that ingress and egress to
and from the premises could be had only through gates provided for that
purpose, and that admission to the premises could be had only upon securing a proper permit from the company's representative or from United
States Army personnel in charge. Once inside the premises, the individual
came under the control and jurisdiction of the United States Army. The
trial court overruled the motion and, after trial, judgment was rendered in
favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed on the
ground that the locus of the accident did not fall within the statute. The
court indicated that the controlling factor, in determining the meaning of
the term "public highway," was whether the public had the right, generally, to use the road. If, as of right, the use of the road was open to the
public, then it was a "public highway." If, on the other hand, the use of
the road could be inhibited by any private person, then the road was not
public, no matter what the facts were regarding its prior use by the public,
the volume of that usage, the state of maintenance or of police jurisdiction. The court was not unaware of the fact that the result reached
was not entirely satisfactory for it said, after noting that other courts
which have dealt with the problem have strictly construed statutes of the
kind in question, that a "strict construction seems unfortunate, for it
1177 F. (2d) 199 (1948).

Civ. Stats. Ann., Vol. 5, Tit. 42, Art. 20301a, §1. The pertinent
parts thereof are as follows: "The acceptance by a nonresident • . . of the rights,
2 Vernon's Tex.

privileges and benefits of the public highways or public streets of this state ...

shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such ponresident... of the Chairman of the State Highway Commission . . . to be his true and lawful attorney and
agent upon whom may be served all lawful process in any civil action . . . growing
out of any accident or collision in which said nonresident . . . may be involved
while operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle on such public highway or public
street. . . ." Italics added.
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may disregard the true intent of the lawmakers as well as the public
policy which prompted the enactments and may operate to defeat the
purpose for which the statutes were enacted. "3
The seeming inequity in the result and the cogency of the observation
made by the judge raises a problem of legislative intent and makes
appropriate an inquiry into the language used in the various nonresident
motorist statutes to ascertain if a distinction between accidents occurring
on public property in contrast to those occurring on private property is
warranted. The principal factors motivating the enactment of statutes
of this nature lie in a recognition of the capability of the negligently
operated vehicle to inflict harm; the ease with which the nonresident tort
feasor may remove himself from the state in which the harm was
inflicted, thereby escaping personal service of process with its consequent
judicial accountability in that state; as well as the burden and handicap
thrust on the resident whose only redress is to pursue the nonresident to
the state of his domicile and there institute action.4 At the outset, then,
it would seem arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable to distinguish
between accidents occurring on private property and those occurring on
public land. To do so is to lose sight of evils sought, in the first instance,
to be rectified. Certainly, the danger of the vehicle is not mitigated by
virtue of its operation on private property. The resident is no less harmed,
while the disadvantage to which he is put, if he would have redress, is
the same.
The answer, then, lies in the language of the statutes themselves.
All of the forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have nonresident
motorist statutes. Common to all of them, are the so-called "agency"
clause and the "coverage" clause. The former is, of course, that part of
the statute under which some designated state officer becomes the agent
of the nonresident; the latter denotes the loci which are intended to be
covered. Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia create the
agency by virtue of the nonresident's use and operation of a motor vehicle
on a public highway and would, seemingly, limit the agency to accidents
occurring on the "public highway" for the limiting term "public highway" appears in both clauses.- A second group of statutes, found in
3 177 F. (2d) 199 at 202.
4 See Scott, "Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists," 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563-86
(1926) ; Culp, "Process in Actions Against Non-resident Motorists," 32 Mich. L.
Rev. 325-50 (1934) ; Culp, "Recent Developments in Actions Against Non-resident
Motorists," 37 Mich. L. Rev. 58-77 (1938).
5 D. C. Code 1940, Tit. 40, § 403; Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 7, § 199; Ariz. Code Ann.
1939, Ch. 66, § 227; Ark. Stat. Ann. 1947, Vol. 3, Ch. 27, § 341; Colo. Stat. Ann. 1935,
Vol. 2, Ch. 16, § 48(1) ; Conn. Stat. 1930, Tit. 58, Ch. 288, § 5475; Del. Laws 1935,
Ch. 225, § 1; Ga. Laws 1937, Part 1, Tit. 6, No. 444, at p. 732; Iowa Code 1946,
Vol. 1, Ch. 321, § 321.498; Burns Ind. Stat. 1933, Vol. 8, Ch. 10 § 47-1043; La Dart
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thirteen states, while in other respects not dissimilar from the first group,
are distinguishable because of the omission of the word "public" in both
the agency and coverage clauses." The basic situation would seem to be
broadened under these statutes unless the term "highway" is given a
narrow definition.
The statutes of Kansas 7 and of New Mexico' are also generally similar
but with one important distinction. The agency is there created by the
use of the "public highway" but thereafter the nonresident becomes
amenable to service of process under the statute for "any accident or
collision in which said motor vehicle may be involved" while it is being
operated in the state. The coverage clause is there clearly intended to
be far broader. The statutes of Tennessee 9 and of New Hampshire 0 also
present variations for in these two instances the agency is created by the
use of "highways" and "ways" respectively, but thereafter coverage is
extended to any accident "in this state," in the words of the Tennessee
statute, or to any accident occurring "on such ways, or elsewhere," in
the words of the New Hampshire statute. The latter, by the insertion of
the words "or elsewhere," seems pointedly to have provided against any
strict construction based on distinctions between public or private property.
The fifth and last group of statutes would appear to be best suited to
cure the evils at which these statutes were aimed for, in seven states,"
the mere operation of a motor vehicle in the state creates the agency and
Civ. Code 1939, Vol. 4, Ch. 4, § 5296; Me. Rev. Stat. 1944, Vol. 1, Oh. 19, § 59;
Flack Md. Ann. Code, 1947 cumin. supp., Art. 56, § 106; Mass. Ann. Laws 1933, Vol.
3, Ch. 90, § 3a; Mich. Stat. Ann., Vol. 8, Tit. 9, Ch. 74, § 9.1701; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
1939, Vol. 18, Ch. 45, Art. 1, § 8410.1; Miss. Code Ann. 1942, Tit. 37, Ch. 4, § 9363;
Nev. Comp. Laws, 1941 supp., Vol. 1, § 4441.01; N. C. Gen. Stats. 1943, Vol. 1, Ch. 1,
§ 1-105; Okla. Stat. Ann. (perm. ed.,) Tit. 47, Ch. 11, § 391; R. I. Gen. Laws 1938,
Ch. 103, § 1; S. C. Code 1942, Vol. 1, Tit. 7, Ch. 16, § 437; Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stat.
Ann., Vol. 5, Tit. 42, Art. 2039a; Remington's Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1937, Vol. 7a,
Tit. 41, § 6360-129; W. Va. Code Ann. 1943, Ch. 56, § 5555 (1).
6 Cal. Deering Vehicle Code Ann. 1944, Ch. 1, § 404; Ida. Code 1947, Vol. 9, Tit.
49, Ch. 12, § 1202; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95 2, § 23; Minn. Stat. Ann. 1945, Vol. 12,
Ch. 170, § 170.55; Mont. Rev. Code 1935, Vol. 1, Ch. 152, § 1760.12; Neb. Rev. Stat.
1943, Vol. 2, Ch. 25, § 530; N. D. Rev. Code 1943, Vol. 3, Ch. 28, § 0611; Ore. Comp.
Laws Ann. 1940, Vol. g, Tit. 115, Ch. 1, Art. 5, § 128B; S. D. Code 1939, Vol. 2,
Ch. 33, § 33.0809; Utah Code Ann. 1943, Vol. 3, Tit. 37, Ch. 13, § 12; Va. Code Ann.
1942, Tit. 18, Ch. 90b, Art. 1, §2154(70) (1) ; Wis. Stats. 1945, Ch. 85, § 85.05(3)
Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1945, Vol. 4, Ch. 60, § 60-1101.
7 Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. 1935, Ch. 8, Art. 4, § 8-401.
8 N. M. Stat. Ann. 1941, Vol. 5, Ch. 68, Art 10, § 68-1003.
9 Williams' Tenn. Code Ann. 1934, Vol. 6, Tit. 1, Ch. 5, Art. 4, § 8671.
10 N. H. Rev. Laws 1942, Vol. 1, Tit. IX, Ch. 116, § 42.
11 Fla. Stat. 1941, Tit. 6, Ch. 47, §§ 47.29-47.30; Ky. Rev. Stat. 1948, Ch. 188,
§ 188.030; N. 3. Stat. Ann., Tit. 2, Ch. 32, § 2:32-34.1; McKinney's New York Consol.
Laws Ann., Vol. 62A, Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 52; Page, Ohio Gen. Code Ann.,
Vol. 4a, Ch. 21, § 6308-1; Purdon's Penn. Stat. Ann. (perm. ed.,), Tit. 75, Ch. 4,
§ 1201; Vt. Stats., 1947 revision, Tit. 46, Ch. 428, § 10062.
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thereafter the nonresident becomes amenable to the process of that state
for "any accidents" in which such nonresident is involved while operating
the motor vehicle "within the state." No attempt is there made to restrict
the locus, so any distinction based on public or private property would
seem to be unwarranted.
The question of locus of the accident, within the meaning of these
statutes, has arisen but few times. For the most part, the courts have
felt themselves bound by the principle that the statutes, being in derogation
of the common law, must be strictly construed. 12 In three cases,' 3 the
courts have even felt that the statutes could not constitutionally apply
to accidents, the causative force of which did not arise from the use of
the highways. The result has been harshness and seeming inequity to the
injured plaintiff, but in most instances the result has been proper in the
light of the statute which the court had to construe. Thus, in those states
which require both the use of the public highway and the occurrence of
an accident thereon to enable the resident to avail himself of the statutory
benefit, the fact that the accident has occurred on a private driveway,",
on the grounds of a filling station," on the grounds of a World's Fair,18
in a privately owned public garage, 17 and on the parking lot of a night
club,' 8 has been held to bar the resident from obtaining service of process

on the nonresident through the statute. The Supreme Court of Louisiana,
however, interpreting a statute similar in language to those under which
the results just noted were obtained, reached a different conclusion in
the case of Galloway v. Wyatt Metal & Boiler Works.'9 The court there
held that a road which was privately owned but was publicly used
constituted a "public" highway within the meaning of the Louisiana
statute. While the result is admirable and in accord with the fundamental
purpose of these statutes, the reasoning therein, in the light of the
statute, is not beyond reproach.
12Kelley v. Koetting, 164 Kan. 542, 190 P. (2d) 361 (1948) ; Jermaine v. Graf,
235 Iowa 1063, 283 N. W. 428 (1939) ; Kerr v. Greenstein, 213 Ark. 447, 212 S. W.
(2d) 1 (1948) ; Mull v. Taylor, 68 Ga. App. 663, 23 S. E. (2d) 595 (1943) ; Kornfleld
v. Hurwitz, 178 Misc. 216, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 820 (1942); Flynn v. Kramer, 271
Mich. 500, 261 N. W. 77 (1935).
13 Finn v. Schreiber, 35 F. Supp. (1940); Brauer Machine & Supply Co. v.
Parkhill Truck Co., 383 Ill. 569, 50 N. E. (2d) 836 (1943); Kelley v. Koetting,
164 Kan. 542, 190 P. (2d) 361 (1948).
14 Dworkin v. Spector Motor Service, Inc., 3 F. R. D. 340 (1944) ; Zielinski v.
Lyford, 175 Misc. 517, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 489 (1940).
15 Finn v. Schreiber, 35 F. Supp. 638 (1940).
16 Catalano v. Maddox, 175 Misc. 24, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 149 (1940).
17 Haughey v. Minneola Garage, Inc., 174 Misc. 332, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 857 (1940).
Is Harris v. Hanson, 75 F. Supp. 481 (1948).
19 189 La. 837, 181 So. 187 (1938).
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It is interesting to note that New York, which at one time belonged
in the category of states first mentioned, amended its statute in 1942 so
as to eliminate any reference to "public" highways. The mere operation
of a motor vehicle in that state now serves to create the agency, and the
nonresident is thereafter amenable to service of process for any accident
in which he may be involved while so operating the motor vehicle. The
New York cases noted above2" all stemmed from causes of action arising
prior to the effective date of the amendment and may have been the cause
of the same. No case bearing on the precise point has been decided in
that state since then21 but it would seem that, by the amendment, the
legislature intended to destroy the arbitrary distinction theretofore
existing between public and private property which produced the results
already observed.
Illinois has likewise had occasion to consider the question. In the
22
case of Brauer Machine & Supply Company v. Parkhill Truck Company,
the decision turned on a question of proximate cause, but the court did
indicate by way of dictum that, as long as the causal force of the accident
originated in the use of the highway, it would make no difference where
the harm was inflicted so the statute could apply. Conversely, the court
indicated that if the nonresident statute was intended to apply to accidents
occurring on private property, both as to cause and effect, it would then
be constitutionally objectionable as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was reasoning of that character which induced Kansas, a state
with a statute which places no restriction on the locus of the accident so
long as the proper agency is created, to reach a result seemingly dissonant
with the language of its statute. In Kelley v. Koetting," the nonresident
combine operator negligently destroyed a resident's wheat while working
on plaintiff's field with his machine. Despite the all-inclusive language of
the statute, the court, one judge dissenting, held that the statute was
20

See notes 14 to 18 inclusive, ante.

21 More recent cases, such as Cooper v. Amehler, 178 Misc. 844, 35 N. Y. S. (2d)

917 (1942) ; LaPlaca v. Hutcheson, 191 Misc. 27, 79 N. Y. S. (2d) 355 (1948);
Lowe v. Western Express Co., 189 Misc. 177, 68 N. Y. S. (2d) 873 (1947) ; and the
like, all deal with other aspects of the law.
22 383 Ill. 569, 50 N. E. (2d) 836, 148 A. L. R. 1208 (194-3). The accident occurred while the nonresident defendant's truck was being unloaded on private
property after traversing the public highways of the state in order to reach the
place of unloading. The truck was at rest at the time and had been so for some

time prior to the accident. The court held there was no connection between the
use and operation of a motor vehicle on the highways and the accident, the use of
the highway not being the causal force of the accident. For that reason, it was
decided that the court had no jurisdiction over defendant by virtue of service had
pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95Y2, § 23.
23 164 Kan. 542, 190 P. (2d) 361 (1948).
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applicable only where the harm resulted from the negligent operation of
a motor vehicle on the state highway.
The point has not arisen for decision in the courts of New Hampshire
and Tennessee, comprising the fourth group in this statutory classification,
but in a decision entirely consistent with the language of the Pennsylvania
statute, falling in the fifth class, the Supreme Court of that state has
decided that accidents occurring on private property clearly fall within
the compress of the statute.2 4 Just as in the instant case, the accident
there involved occurred on private property. Considering the constitutional issue, the court noted that to hold that state police power in this
regard could not "constitutionally be exercised beyond the highway itself
and encompass within its scope instances where the nonresident, after
having entered the state over state highways, proceeds onto private
property and there causes injury to another, would [be to] create an
unreasonable distinction. 25
If the result in the instant case is unsatisfactory, the fault would
seem to lie in the language of the statute which necessitated the result
rather than in the reasoning of the court. Logically, no other result could
be justified for the inherent limitations of the language employed admit
of no other construction. The choice of language in the Texas statute,
and those similar to it, is unfortunate. To create a distinction between
public and private property insofar as the locus of the accident is concerned, is to lose sight of the harm to be righted, and the capability of
the negligently operated motor vehicle to inflict harm, no matter where
it is driven. New York, where the question has most frequently arisen,
has recognized the invalidity and basic injustice in such a distinction
and has rectified the situation by an appropriate amendment. It is to
be hoped that other states with limited statutes will take cognizance of
the situation.
F. J. LYNCH
Sipe v. Moyer, 353 Pa. 75, 44 A. (2d) 263 (1945).
353 Pa. 75 at 78, 44 A. (2d) 263 at 264. The constitutional issue raised in Hess
v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927), dealt principally
with the issue as to whether the mere use of the highways of a state by a non24

25

resident could be sufficient, by implication, to constitute his appointment of the
designated state officer as his agent for service of process. The court therein did
not unequivocally state that such agency would be limited to accidents occurring
on a public highway, although it did say that, under the statute before it, the
"implied consent is limited to proceedings growing out of accidents or collisions on
a highway in which the nonresident may be involved." It should be recognized
that this language was spoken of a statute from Massachusetts, then under consideration, which did in fact limit the agency created. The quoted language is
aptly descriptive of the Massachusetts statute, but it is by no means a generalization
on the point. To contend, as has been suggested, that this language was intended
to limit the applicability of statutes of the kind in question to accidents occurring
only on the highways, and to no others, seems unwarranted.
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JUDGMENT-PLEADING--WHETHER

COUNTERCLAIM MAY BE INTERPOSED IN

OR

NOT

COERCIVE

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION-

When Professor Sunderland wrote in 1917 about that modern evolution
in remedial rights designated as the declaratory judgment, he visualized
it as a friendly suit which would put less strain on the business and
personal relations of the parties and lead to less animosities than a suit
for coercive relief.1 He saw, in the action, a cooperative proceeding in
which the courts would operate as "diplomatic" instead of "belligerent"
agencies. When a plaintiff approaches a court acting as such a diplomatic
agency, seeking its advice, a problem may arise as to whether it would be
proper for the court to permit the defendant to change the character of
the litigation and demand a coercive countersuit. In the recent case of
Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company of New York v. Friedley,2 a
federal district court sitting in Iowa decided, for the first time, the question whether reformation of a contract might be obtained under a counterclaim to an action for a declaratory judgment. An agent of the insurance
company there concerned had written a policy of automobile insurance on
the car of the defendant. Since the latter was a minor, the agent caused
the policy to be issued in the name of his mother, representing this to be a
standard practice in the business. When the minor became involved in
an accident, the plaintiff sought a declaration of non-liability under the
policy because of breach of the sole ownership clause. The defendants
unsuccessfully tried to establish that the clause had been waived by the
misrepresentation of the agent. The judge found that there had been a
mutual mistake but likewise held there was no valid reason why reformation could not be pleaded defensively in a declaratory judgment action and
granted such relief even though the defendants had not specifically requested the same.3
The decision is in harmony with the policy of liberality under which
the federal courts have permitted counterclaims in declaratory actions
whether based on the former 4 or the present federal Declaratory Judgment
1 Sunderland, "A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights-The Declaratory Judgment," 16 Mich. L. Rev. 69 at 76 (1917).
2 79 F. Supp. 978 (1948).
3 Rule 54(c) of the Fed. Rules of Civ. Pro., 28 U. S. C. A. foll. § 723c, directs
that every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party Is entitled even
though no demand therefor appears in the pleadings. Reformation was prayed
for in counterclaims to declaratory actions in Aralac Inc. v. Hat Corp. of America,
166 F. (2d) 286 (1948), and in Tolle v. Struve, 124 Cal. App. 263, 12 P. (2d) 61
(1932), but in each case the court found no ground for reformation hence did
*not pass on the procedural question of the propriety of the counterclaim. In the
.California case mentioned, one involving the validity of certain leases, it was
held proper, however, to render judgment against the plaintiff for rent which had
accrued.
4 28 U. S. C. § 400 was repealed in 1948.
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Act. 5 In common actions begun by insurers seeking a declaration as to
their rights and liabilities under policies, counterclaims for the amount
due thereon to the insured or to the beneficiary have been considered
proper.6 Where a life insurance company, for example, sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether a policy was in force at the time of
the death of the insured, it was held proper to set aside a purported
release executed under a mutual mistake of law and fact, although the
defendant did not ask for rescission or cancellation of the release. 7 In
actions brought to have the defendant's patent declared invalid, it is.

common to find counterclaims therein for infringement, not only of the
patent sought to be declared invalid' but also of other patents held by
the counter-plaintiff. 9 Such counterclaims in patent suits have even
included requests for further relief such as for an injunction and an
accounting. 10 Similarly, in actions for judgments to declare trade-marks
invalid, counterclaims have been upheld for infringement and injunction 1
2

or for unfair competition.1
In view of this weight of precedent, an objection to coercive counterclaims in declaratory judgment proceedings is now rarely heard under
the federal rules. A litigant bringing a declaratory judgment action in a
5 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201-2.
6 See Merchants Indemnity Corp. of America v. Dana, 8 F. R. D. 32 (1948);
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 43 F. Supp. 870 (1942), reversed
on other grounds in 136 F. (2d) 807 (1943), cert. den. 320 U. S. 768, 64 S. Ct.
80, 88 L. Ed. 459 (1943); Home Ins. Co. v. Trotter, 130 F. (2d) 800 (1942).
7

Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Forcier, 103 F. (2d) 166 (1939), cert. den. 308 U. S.

571, 60 S. Ct. 86, 84 L. Ed. 479 (1939).
8 General Electric Co. v. Refrigeration Patents Corp., 65 F. Supp. 75 (1946);
National Aluminate Corporation v. Permutit Co., 53 F. Supp. 501 (1943), affirmed

in 145 F. (2d) 175 (1944), cert. den. 324 U. S. 864, 65 S. Ct. 912, 89 L. Ed. 1420
(1945) ; Ryan Distributing Corporation v. Caley, 51 F. Supp. 377 (1943), affirmed
In 147 F. (2d) 138 (1945), cert. den. 325 U. S. 859, 65 S. Ct. 1199, 89 L. Ed.

1979 (1945), but counterclaim denied on merits non obstante veredicto; Petersime
Incubator Co. v. Bundy Incubator Co., 135 F. (2d) 580 (1943), cert. den. 320
U. S. 805, 64 S. Ct. 24, 88 L. Ed. 487 (1943); Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp.,
122 F. (2d) 925 (1941), cert. den. 315 U. S. 813. 62 S. Ct. 798, 86 L. Ed. 1211
(1941), rehear. den. 315 U. S. 831, 62 S. Ct. 913, 86 L. Ed. 1224 (1941) ; Myers v.
Beckman, 1 F. R. D. 99 (1940).
9 Randolph Laboratories v. Specialties Development Corp., 82 F. Supp. 316

(1949) ; White v. E. L. Bruce Co., 62 F. Supp. 577 (1945) ; Refractolite Corp. v.
Prismo Holding Corp., 117 F. (2d) 806 (1941) ; Parris-Dunn Corporation v. Fales,
36 F. Supp. 51 (1940).
10 National Aluminate Corporation v. Permutit Co., 53 F. Supp. 501 (1943),
affirmed In 145 F. (2d) 175 (1944), cert. den. 324 U. S. 864, 65 S. Ct. 912, 89 L. Ed.
1420 (1945); Petersime Incubator Co. v. Bundy Incubator Co., 135 F. (2d) 580
(1943), cert. den. 320 U. S. 805, 64 S. Ct. 24, 88 L. Ed. 487 (1943); Refractolite
Corp. v. Prismo Holding Corp., 117 F. (2d) 806 (1941).
11 Swarthmore Classics v. Swarthmore Junior, 81 F. Supp. 917 (1949).
In

Quaker Oats Co. v. General Mills, 134 F. (2d) 429 (1943), the counterclaim was
dismissed on the merits.
12 House of Westmore v. Denney, 151 F. (2d) 261 (1945).
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federal court should realize that he may be placed in a difficult situation.
In a recent case, that of Merchants Indemnity Corporation of New York v.
Dana,13 a liability insurer instituted an action against an employee of its
insured to determine whether he drove an automobile with the permission
of his employer at the time when he became involved in an accident.
Cross-claims were filed therein to recover for injuries and death due to
the negligence of the defendant. The counsel for the plaintiff found himself in the anomalous position of opposing the employee of the insured
on the complaint but also forced to defend him against the cross-claimants.
A request for an extension of time as to the cross-claims, until a determination had been had on the issues of the complaint, was denied in order
to avoid a delay in the expeditious disposal of all the issues.
Turning to the decisions of the state courts, there is a paucity of
specific decisions on the propriety of the use of coercive counterclaims.
The most detailed discussion may be found in the Utah case of Gray v.
Defa.14 The Utah statute made no provision for the use of a counterclaim
nor did it anyway prescribe the procedure to be followed in seeking relief
under the act. 15 The trial court's refusal to take evidence on the counterclaim was held to be error by the Supreme Court of that state which
decided there was no reason to give a narrow construction to the statute
so as to prevent a court from entering the usual legal or equitable coercive
judgment customary on a counterclaim. The Oregon case of Lowe v. Harmon'1 is similar in its facts.
In both cases, the cross-defendants based their arguments on the doctrine of Brindley v. Meara,'7 an Indiana case in which the Supreme Court
of that state had held that supplementary relief available under a declaratory judgment act' s was limited to declaratory relief and did not authorize
the grant of a coercive judgment. Both reasoned that if the relief available to a plaintiff is limited, the counterclaimant should be in no better
position, but the Utah and Oregon courts rejected the Indiana doctrine
and adopted instead the more liberal view expressed by two of the leading
text writers on the subject.19 The Utah court even went so far as to deny
13 8 F. R. D. 32 (1948).

14 103 Utah 339, 135 P. (2d) 251, 155 A. L. R. 395 (1943). The plaintiff there
sought a declaration that he owned the land in question free from all adverse
claims of the defendants. Defendants counterclaimed for a complete adjudication
of their rights under a contract of sale and leasehold agreement and for damages.
15 Utah Code 1943, Tit. 104, Ch. 64.
16 167 Ore. 128, 115 P. (2d) 297 (1941).
17 209 Ind. 144, 198 N. E. 301. 101 A. L. R. 682 (1935).
18 Ind. Acts 1927, Ch. 81, p. 209.
19 Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (Banks-Baldwin Pub. Co., Cleveland, 1941),
2d Ed., p. 441; Anderson. Actions for Declaratory Judgments (West Pub. Co., St.
Paul, 1940), p. 573. See also Borchard, "An Indiana Declaratory Judgment,"
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that the declaratory judgment statute set up a new form of action entitled
20
to special treatment, considering it to be merely a "new form of relief.''
A declaratory judgment proceeding is usually described as sui generis,
being deemed neither strictly legal or equitable. 21 In Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Jones, 22 however, the Missouri Supreme Court emphasized that the historical affinity of the action is equitable, 23 hence it could
see no procedural reason to refuse a cross-action for affirmative relief.
The court admitted that, by interposition of a demand for an injunction,
the suit was converted into a suit in equity.
Difficulty may be expected where special state statutes regulate the
use of counterclaims in particular types of actions. A New York statute,
for example, once permitted counterclaims in matrimonial actions only
"where an action for divorce, separation or annulment is brought by
husband and wife. "24 In Kiebler v. Kiebler,25 where a husband asked for
a declaration that he was validly divorced, it was held to be proper for
his wife to counterclaim for a divorce. But in Zawadsky v. Zawadsky,26
where a husband sought a decision that no valid marriage had been contracted, a counterclaim for separation was held improper as barred by
statute, although the court stated that the declaratory judgment act of
the state27 was "broad enough to permit matrimonial counterclaims in
actions which are not matrimonial in character." 28- Justice Pecora, in
Antrones v. Antrones, 29 refused to follow this decision. He admitted that
a declaratory action to have a marriage declared void was matrimonial in
nature but permitted the counterclaim to stand on the ground that the
"provisions for the interposition of counterclaims should be liberally
'30
construed so that related issues may be determined in one action."
Emphasis on the point that the issues should be related is probably without
11 Ind. L. J. 376 (1936). An express repudiation of the holding in Brindley v.
Meara also appears in the case of Morris v. Ellis, 221 Wis. 307, 266 N. W. 921
(1936).
20 The court was probably concerned with the fact that any other holding would
be inconsistent with a constitutional requirement to the effect that there should
be but one form of civil action.
21 See Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Vince, 118 F. (2d) 232 (1941), cert. den.
314 U. S. 637, 62 S. Ct. 71, 86 L. Ed. 511 (1941) : United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Koch, 102 F. (2d) 288, 123 A. L. R. 279 (1939) ; Progressive Party v. Flynn,
400 Ill. 102, 79 N. E. (2d) 516 (1948).
22 344 Mo. 932, 130 S. W. (2d) 945, 125 A. L. R. 1149 (1939).
23 Such is also the view of Borchard, op. cit., pp. 237-40 and 439.
24 New York Civil Practice Act, § 1168. The statute was repealed in 1948.
25 170 Misc. 81, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 909 (1939).
26 169 Misc. 404, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 966 (1938).
27 New York Civil Practice Act, § 266.
28 169 Misc. 404 at 406, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 966 at 968.
29 58 N. Y. S. (2d) 241 (1945).
3058 N. Y. S. (2d) 241 at 243.
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significance in the more modern code states3 but, since the older codes
still require that the subject of the counterclaim be connected with the
subject of the action or arise out of the same transaction, 32 it is not surprising to find a counterclaim in a declaratory judgment action failing
for non-compliance with these rules. 33
Neither the Illinois Civil Practice Act nor the rules of the Supreme
Court contain any express provision indicating the propriety of the interposition of a coercive counterclaim in a declaratory judgment proceeding.
The section of declaratory judgments, 34 adopted in 1945, is quite liberal
dnd was based primarily on the Michigan act 5 with significant additions
such as the one which authorizes the declaration of rights as an incident
to a counterclaim. 36 Subsection 3 thereof, providing for further relief, is
similar to a Kentucky statute37 as well as to the Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act, 38 but there has been no precise interpretation of the statute
on this point as yet. 39
Most courts will permit a defendant, unwilling to have a declaratory
proceeding conducted as a friendly suit at the diplomatic level, to convert
the litigation into a regular legal battle with full belligerent status and
consequences. Under codes as liberal as the federal, the court may even
decide so to convert the character of the suit on its own motion in order
to assure a final adjudication of all the issues. The processes of change,
leading to uniformity in all types of actions, legal, equitable, or special
in origin, appear to be irreversible. It is regrettable that such should be
the case when the worthy objectives proposed by Professor Sunderland
are sacrificed along the way.
H. A. WoNER
3' Compare Danziger v. Peebler, 88 Cal. App. (2d) 314, 198 P. (2d) 719 (1948),
with Robertson v. Marcevich, 42 Cal. App. (2d) 610, 109 P. (2d) 708 (1941).
32 In general, see 47 Am. Jur., Set-off and Counterclaim, §§ 44 and 46.
33 Montgomery v. City and County of Denver, 102 Colo. 427, 80 P. (2d) 434
(1938).
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 181.1.
35 Mich. Comp. Laws 1929, § 13903 et seq.
36 A counterclaim for declaratory relief was filed to a declaratory action in the
case of Progressive Party v. Flynn, 400 Ill. 102, 79 N. E. (2d) 516 (1948).
37 Carrol's Ky. Code 1948, § 639(a) (1) et seq. Under this statute, in George v.
George, 238 Ky. 381, 141 S. W. (2d) 558 (1940), injunctive relief was granted
under a counterclaim to a declaratory action.
38 9 Unif. Laws Anno., Declaratory Judgment Act, pp. 213 and 252.
39 Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 335 Il. App. 106, 80 N. E. (2d) 548 (1948),
reversed on other grounds in 403 Ill. 260, 85 N. E. (2d) 722 (1949), comes closest
to the point but the issue was not argued therein. The case proceeded as a suit
for a declaration that an amendment to a corporate charter was valid. The defendant, by counterclaim, sought payment of dividends allegedly due. There may be
a hint of criticism in the remark of the Appellate Court to the effect that the
record did not show "that the propriety of the summary judgment procedure was
questioned."
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IN ONE YEAR OR DEED WrLL BE VoID--In the recent case of

Midwest-

Radiant Corporationv. Hentze,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit was required to construe the effect of an instrument
by which the grantor conveyed and quit-claimed all her interest in the
coal underlying her farm in a down-state Illinois county in consideration
for one dollar and certain specified royalty payments. The instrument
provided that the grantee was to commence the sinking of a mine in six
months and to have it in operation in one year, or the deed would be void.
The grantee never entered upon or developed the property. Seven years
after the execution of the instrument, without taking action of any kind,
the grantor conveyed the farm to a third person and warranted title to
the entire fee. Thirty-five years later, the present owner of the farm
leased the same to the plaintiff under a mineral lease for the purpose of
mining coal thereon. Thereafter, the defendant procured a quit-claim deed
from the grantee in the initial mineral instrument and laid claim to the
coal. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to the effect that the
defendant had no right, title or interest in the coal, thereby raising an
issue as to whether the rights acquired by the grantee in the original
instrument were terminated by abandonment evidenced by his failure, for
forty years, to sink a mine or enter upon and develop the property. The
trial court entered judgment for the defendant, holding that the material
instrument was effective to convey an estate upon condition subsequent
which could not be lost merely by nonfulfillment of the condition subsequent or by reason of abandonment. Plaintiff appealed, contending that
the instrument should have been construed as a mining lease or, even if
treated as a grant, the abandonment clause therein should have been
given effect. The Court of Appeals reversed in plaintiff's favor, holding
that, whether the instrument be construed as a mining lease or a grant,
the necessity for giving such a construction as would carry out the
manifest intention of the parties required that the instrument be treated
as one designed to convey an estate on condition precedent which had
never materialized by reason of abandonment.
No Illinois reviewing court has, as yet, passed upon the precise
question presented by the instant case, i.e. whether an instrument, similar
to the one in question and executed under like circumstances, is a deed
or merely a lease, together with the subsidiary question as to whether,
if construed as a grant, it should be held to create an estate on condition
1171 F.

(2d) 635 (1948).
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precedent or on condition subsequent. Lacking state precedent, the federal
court was compelled to turn to a decision from another jurisdiction2 in
order to reach the result above set forth. It must be noted, however, that
such result is only persuasive authority so far as Illinois courts are
concerned,' the decision being no more than an indication of what the
federal court thinks the Illinois law on the subject should be. A review
of the decisions of courts of other jurisdictions upon the question, as well
as those Illinois decisions bearing upon related questions, is appropriate,
therefore, in order to determine the probable effect of the instant decision
upon Illinois law.
It has long been established that rights acquired under a mining
lease proper, given in consideration of royalties or a percentage of the
profits to be derived from development, may be lost by nonuser or
abandonment.4 In the instant case, however, the defendant relied on the
presence in the instrument of the words "convey and quit-claim,"
sufficient under Illinois law to convey a title,5 which title, according to
Uphoff v. Trustees of Tufts College6 and Jilek v. Chicago, Wilmington &
Franklin Coal Company,7 is ordinarily not lost by abandonment. In
those cases, it was held that where there has been a severance, by deed,
of title between the surface and the underlying minerals, mere nonuser
or abandonment by the grantee is not sufficient in and of itself to
terminate the mineral estate. However, as the court properly pointed
out, those cases are distinguishable from the instant case. Each involved
an absolute and present conveyance, completely closed at the time of the
transaction, without condition and based on a present consideration,
whereas the instrument before the court recited a nominal consideration
of one dollar, called for specified royalty payments, and contained an
express condition that development should be commenced within a specified
time. It shall be shown that the presence of these features, viewed
in the light of prevailing principles and precedents, made inevitable the
result achieved in the instant case.
The decisions in the Uphoff and Jilek cases are logical extensions
of the principle that, according to the common law, there can be no
divestiture of a vested legal title by abandonment unless the same results
2 Vandenbark v. Busiek, 126 F. (2d) 893 (1942).
3 See Rothschild & Co. v. Steger & Sons Piano Mfg. Co., 256 Il1. 196, 99 N. E. 920
(1912).
4 Brown v. Wilmore Coal Co., 153 F. 14'3 (1907) cert. den. 209 U. S. 546, 28 S. Ct.

758, 52 L. Ed. 920 (1908) ; McColl v. Bear Creek Coal Min. Co., 162 Iowa 491, 143
N. W. 532 (1913) ; Chandler v. French, 73 W. Va. 658, 81 S. E. 825 (1914).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 30, § 9.

6 351 Ill. 146, 184 N. E. 213 (1933).
7382 Ill. 241, 47 N. E. (2d) 96 (1943).
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from some form of estoppel or because of sufficient adverse possession
under a statute of limitation." In the application of that principle, it has
been held that a conveyance by deed of mineral rights or surface rights
alone creates two distinct estates in land9 and, where there has been
such a severance of the surface and the underlying minerals, mere possession of the surface is not possession of the minerals, hence occupancy of
the surface by the original owner, or those claiming under him, does not
cause the statute of limitation to run against the mineral owner. 10 It has
also been held that deeds by the original owner, even those purporting
to convey the entire title, do not operate as adverse possession or notice
of an adverse claim."
The aforementioned principle is applicable, however, only in cases
where title has actually vested in the mineral owner. The result in the
instant case is grounded upon the determination of the court that title
never vested in the grantee under the instrument involved. The sinking
and operation of a mine within one year was held to be a condition
precedent, a dondition which has been defined as one which must happen
before an estate can vest or be enlarged. 1 2 The condition precedent
being unfulfilled, no title vested in the grantee. As a result, there was
no basis for the application of the doctrine of the Uphoff and Jilek cases.
Undoubtedly, if the condition had been construed as a condition
subsequent, the rights acquired under the deed would not have been
terminated by the mere nonperformance thereof. Conditions subsequent
are such that, by their failure or nonperformance, an estate already
vested may be defeated," but the breach thereof does not per se produce
a reversion of the title. The estate continues in the grantee until some
proper step has been taken to consummate a forfeiture, such as a re-entry
or some other act that may be considered a lawful substitute therefor. 4
There must be some affirmative, positive act manifesting the intention to
this end,"5 and it has been held that the mere execution and recording of
a deed to a third person is not such an act. 16
8 Tennessee Oil, Gas & Mineral Co. v. Brown, 131 F. 696 (1904), cert. den. 197
U. S. 621, 25 S. Ct. 798, 49 L. Ed. 910 (1905) ; Eastern Kentucky Mineral & T. Co.
v. Swann-Day L. Co., 148 Ky. 82, 146 S. W. 438 (1912).
9 Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, 176 Ill. 275, 52 N. E. 144 (1898).
10 Brooke v. Dellinger, 193 Ga. 66, 17 S. E. (2d) 178 (1941) ; Franklin Fluorspar
Co. v. Hosick, 239 Ky. 454, 39 S. W.

(2d)

665 (1931).

11 Renfro v. Hanon, 297 Ill. 353, 130 N. E. 740 (1921) ; Gill v. Fletcher, 74 Ohio
295, 78 N. E. 433 (1906).
12 Maguire v. City of Macomb, 293 Ill. 441, 127 N. E. 682 (1920).
13 Nowak v. Dombrowski, 267 Ill. 103, 107 N. E. 807 (1915).
14 Hart v. Lake, 273 Ill. 60, 112 N. E. 286 (1916).
15 Mercer-Lincoln Pine Knob Oil Co. v. Pruitt, 191 Ky. 207, 229, S. W. 374 (1921).
16Rannels v. Rowe, 145 F. 296 (1906), cert. den. 207 U. S. 591, 28 S. Ct. 257,
52 L. Ed. 355 (1907).
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It is often difficult to determine whether a condition is precedent or
subsequent for the same words may be employed to create each according
to the intention of the person creating the condition. 7 Consequently, it
has been affirmed as a general proposition that a decision on the question
of the nature of a condition depends not so much on artificial rules of
construction as it does on the application of good sense and sound equity
to the spirit of the instrument.' 8 The instant decision, in holding that
the provision involved was a condition precedent, is a good illustration
of the application of that principle.
The court is not without support in its holding in the instant case
that, despite the presence in the instrument of words of conveyance, title
did not vest in the grantee. It has been held that the presence of words
of conveyance in a mineral deed is not sufficient to require a holding that
the effect thereof is to vest in the grantee title to the mineral interests in
the land. 19 The courts strive to give effect to the ruling intention of the
parties, and in ascertaining that intention they closely scrutinize the real
consideration flowing to the grantor to determine whether he has retained
such a continuing interest in the premises as would be prejudiced by the
failure of the grantee to develop the mineral estate. Typical of the
prevailing view are the decisions in the cases of Tennessee Oil, Gas &
Mineral Company v. Brown2 ° and Eastern 'Kentucky Mineral & Timber
Company v. Swann-Day Lumber Campany.21 In those cases, the instruments involved recited nominal considerations plus reservations of
continuing interests; in the form of royalties in the Brown case, but a
percentage of the profits that the grantee might realize in the Swan-Day
case. Both cases culminated in holdings that the rights of the grantees
were terminated by abandonment, the presence in the instruments of
words of conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding. In each case it was
decided that the nature of the real consideration moving to the grantor
required a holding that the instrument did not result in an out and out
conveyance in praesenti. The courts were of the opinion that to hold
otherwise would be to place upon the instruments highly unreasonable
constructions, directly opposed to the manifest intention of the parties.
Admittedly, the owner of land has a right to dispose of his interest
17 Burdis v. Burdis, 96 Va. 81, 30 S. E. 462 (1898).
is Phillips v. Gannon, 246 Ill. 98, 92 N. E. 616 (1910).
19 Crain v. Pure Oil Co., 25 F. (2d) 824 (1928).
20131 F. 696 (1904), cert. den. 197 U. S. 621, 25 S. Ct. 798, 49 L. Ed. 910 (190).
21 148 Ky. 82, 146 S. W. 438 (1912).
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therein for any valuable consideration he may choose to accept, 2 but the
prevailing view appears to be that the recital of a nominal consideration
coupled with the reservation of royalties or a percentage of profits
indicates that the real consideration inducing the conveyance is the
development of the property, 23 and, in the absence of any showing that
the true consideration is other than that appearing on the face of the
instrument, courts are reluctant to give such a construction to the
instrument as would place it absolutely in the power of the grantee to
hold the property for an indefinite period of time, or forever, without
ever attempting to pursue the essential purposes and objects of the
24
conveyance.
It would appear that this attitude serves to safeguard both public
and private interests in the development of minerals, to the extent that
it discourages inactivity on the part of holders of mineral interests under
instruments similar to the one under consideration. The instant decision
is to be commended, therefore, not only because it is in harmony with
sound principles and precedents but also because of its salutary effect
upon the development of the state's natural resources.
A. N. HAMILTON

SEARCHES AND

SEIZURES--UNREASONABLE

SEARCHES AND

WHETHER MEMBERS OP A PARTNERSHIP MAY CLAIM
AMENDMENT

AGAINST

SUBPOENA

TO

PRODUCE

SEIZURES-

BENEFIT OF FOURTH

PARTNERSHIP

BOOKS

AND

RECORD--A recent ruling of a federal district court sitting in California
dealt with the question as to whether the protection of the Fourth Amendment could be invoked by a partner against an alleged unreasonable search
of partnership papers.1 The Anti-Trust Division of the Department of
Justice had there caused a subpoena duces tecum to be issued to one of
the partners of a California partnership directing him to produce certain
specified records and communications for use as evidence in a criminal
prosecution against other members of the partnership. The other partners
appeared and moved to quash the subpoena as being in violation of their
22 See Franklin Fluorspar Co. v. Hosick, 239 Ky. 454, 39 S. W. (2d) 665 (1931),
holding that a mineral deed vested title in the grantee where the instrument recited a consideration of "one dollar in hand paid" and no royalty or percentage of
profits was reserved.
23 See Paine v. Griffiths, 86 F. 452 (1898); Kentucky Rock Asphalt Co. v. Milliner, 234 Ky. 217; 27 S. W. (2d) 937 (1930) ; Munsey v. Marnet Oil & Gas Co.,
113 Tex. 212, 254 S. W. 311 (1923).
24 See Crain v. Pure Oil Co., 25 F. (2d) 824 (1928); Hawkins v. Pepper, 117
N. C. 407, 23 S. E. 434 (1895).
1 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (1949).
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rights. The court granted the motion, holding that the subpoena was
violative of the movants' rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The ruling necessarily revolved around the nature and extent of the
protection afforded by the constitutional guaranty as interpreted by the
courts. It has been well established that compulsory production by an
individual of his private papers, under force of a subpoena duces tecum,
whether to be used against him in criminal proceedings or to effect a
forfeiture of his property, is an unreasonable search and seizure.2 The
doctrine has been also invoked for the protection of a corporation, 3
although in a much more limited sense than is true of the absolute protection afforded the individual. A corporation may be required to produce its papers and records under a proper subpoena 4 because of a
difference in the nature of the relationship existing between an individual
and the state on the one hand and that of a corporation and the state
on the other. The corporation, being a creature of the state, is subject to
visitorial powers for, being limited to the specific powers granted, it owes
a duty to the state to open its doors to an investigation by the state
designed to determine whether the power conferred has been used or
abused. The human being owes no such duty to the state for he has
received nothing from it insofar as his powers to act are concerned, albeit
he does get protection in the exercise thereof. The right to require a
corporation to bring in its records is, nevertheless, subject to limitations
based upon reasonableness in the exercise thereof, so the subpoena must
be definite, must specify particular papers, and must be motivated by more
than a mere desire to find some violation of the law from a general perusal
of all corporate records and papers.5 In this limited sense, therefore,
corporations enjoy a measure of protection under the Fourth Amendment
but such protection is afforded to the corporation alone. It may not be
invoked by either an officer 6 or a stockholder, 7 when ordered to produce
corporate papers, so as to serve as a personal privilege, for the right is a
2 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 24 S. Ct. 563, 48 L.
Ed. 860 (1903) ; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746
(1885).
3 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1905).
4 Coastwise Lumber & Supply Co. v. United States, 259 F. 849 (1919).
5 Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, 44 S. Ct.
336, 68 L. Ed. 696 (1923); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S.
385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319 (1919) ; Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361,
31 S. Ct. 538, M L. Ed. 771 (1910) ; Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont,
207 U. S. 541, 28 S. Ct. 178, 52 L. Ed. 327 (1907).
6 Wheeler v. United States, 226 U. S. 478, 33 S. Ct. 158, 57 L. Ed. 309 (1912)
American Lithographic Co. v. Werckmeister, 221 U. S. 603, 31 S. Ct. 676, 55 L.
Ed. 873 (1910) ; Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 31 S. Ct. 538, 55 L. Ed.
771 (1910) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1905).
7 Grant v. United States, 227 U. S. 74, 33 S. Ct. 190, 57 L. Ed. 423 (1912).
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personal one and may be relied upon only by the person who is the owner
of the documents in question. 8
A fairly logical extension of these doctrines has led to the conclusion
that a member of a labor union, 9 or of any other voluntary association, 1 °
stands in the same relative position as would an officer or a stockholder of
a corporation. Neither may refuse to produce the papers or records of
his organization under the direction of a lawful subpoena duces tecum for
organizations of this nature cannot be said to embody or represent the
purely private or personal interests of the individual members. Because
corporations" and other associations such as labor unions 12 and fraternal
organizations's have been regarded as entities, distinct and separate from
the officers, members, or stockholders thereof, it is quite apparent that
the former and not the latter are the only ones privileged with respect to
the papers and records of the organization.
The ruling in the instant case, considering the personal aspects of the
constitutional privilege in issue, necessarily demands an investigation into
the true nature of the status of a partnership, to ascertain whether it
should be regarded as a distinct entity or, as was the case at common law,
a contractual relationship incapable of existence independent of the individuals composing it. 14 As California disclaims the entity theory of partnership, it was inevitable that the result reached in the instant case should
be to quash the subpoena as a violation of the rights of the individual
partner for ownership and possession of partnership property, in California, is in the partners as co-owners and not in any entity.15
Considering the impact of this decision, however, while noting that it
is the first recorded case wherein the question of the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment to partnership papers has been taken up, it should
not be concluded that the case establishes a general rule that the individual
members of all partnerships will be entitled to protection. Rather, it
extends a general test, in use since Hale v. Henkel,'6 to a partnership, i. e.
is the organization such that it may be regarded as an entity or not? A
8 United States v. Hoyt, 53 F. (2d) 881 (1931) ; United States v. Goss, 14 F. (2d)
229 (1926).
9 United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 64 S. Ct. 1248, 88 L. Ed. 1542 (1943).
10 Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795 (1920).
11 Guckenheimer v. United States, 3 F. (2d) 786 (1925).
12 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570, 66 L.
Ed. 975 (1921).
's United States v. Wainer, 49 F. (2d) 789 (1931).
14 47 C. J., Partnership, § 172, p. 747.
15 Cal. Civ. Code, § 2419. See also Park v. Union Mfg. Co., 159 Cal. 260, 114 P.
(2d) 373 (1941) ; People v. Maljan, 34 Cal. App. 384, 167 P. 547 (1917).
16201 U. S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1905).
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number of states have adopted the civil law concept of a societas under
which a juristic person is created separate and distinct from the membership. 1 7 In these states,' 8 it would logically follow that the entity would be
the only one entitled to claim protection against an unreasonable search
and seizure of partnership papers. The majority of states, however,
including Illinois, 9 still adhere to the common law concept so, if the
instant case is followed, in such jurisdictions the individual partner might
bring partnership papers under the shield of the Fourth Amendment.
F.

WOOD

§ 196, p. 1407.
The states involved are Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New
Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Carolina, as indicated by judicial decisions
therefrom as follows: Floyd & Lee v. Boyd, 16 Ga. 34, 84 S. E. 494 (1915);
Fenner & Beane v. Nelson, 64 Ga. App. 600, 13 S. E. (2d) 694 (1941); Soursos
v. Mason City, 230 Iowa 157, 296 N. W. 807 (1941); Toelke v. Toelke, 153 La.
697, 96 So. 536 (1923) ; Lebato v. Paulino, 304 Mich. 668, 8 N. W. (2d) 873 (1943) ;
In re Zent's Estate, 148 Neb. 104, 26 N. W. (2d) 793 (1947) ; Finston v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 132 N. J. L. 276, 39 A. (2d) 697 (1944) ; Anderson
v. Dukes, 193 Okla. 395, 143 P. (2d) 800 (1943); Leadbetter v. Price, 102 Ore.
47. 201 P. 428 (1921) ; Chitwood v. McMillan, 189 S. C. 262, 1 S. E. (2d) 162
(1939).
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 106 , § 25. As to co-ownership of partnership property, see Lindley v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 506, 56 N. E. (2d) 71 (1944) ; Lueth v.
Goodknecht, 345 Ill. 197, 177 N. E. 690 (1931).
The case of Abbott v. Anderson,
265 Ill. 285, 106 N. E. 782 (1914), denies the existence of a separate partnership
entity so far as the Illinois partnership is concerned.
17 40 C. J., Modern Civil Law,
18
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SHOW FULL COMPLIANCE

WITH STATUTF--The case of Rompza v. Lucas' serves warning on all who
contemplate relying on the provisions of the Illinois statute which permits
service of process on the Secretary of State in actions involving nonresident
vehicle operators2 that close attention to statutory requirements is essential before the court can acquire valid jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant. The case arose out of an accident occurring in Illinois. Plaintiff sought to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant, pursuant to the
statute, by filing a copy of the summons with the Secretary of State and
by sending, through registered mail, a notice of such service and a copy
of the summons to the defendant at his last known address. Defendant's
signed receipt for the latter was obtained.3 Plaintiff then filed his affidavit
of compliance, bearing a date approximately one year after the accident,
in which the foregoing facts were recited together with a statement that
the defendant "is a nonresident of this state" and that defendant's last
known place of residence "is" a specified location in Wisconsin.4 Although
defendant had filed an answer, neither the court nor the plaintiff were
advised thereof and a default judgment was taken against defendant. The
latter subsequently moved to vacate the default judgment, contending the
service of process was defective, and was successful. On appeal by plaintiff, this order was affirmed on the ground that the affidavit of compliance
with the statute was deficient in that it did not make it appear that
defendant was a nonresident on the date of the accident but, rather, dis5
closed only that he was a nonresident on the date the affidavit was made.
The statute not having been strictly observed, the service was invalid.
The case appears to be the first one in Illinois considering the requirements for a sufficient affidavit to show compliance with the statute in
question. As the court is to determine its jurisdiction therefrom, it would
1337 I1.

App. 106, 85 N. E.

(2d) 467 (1949).

2 Il1.

Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95 , § 23.
3 As to the necessity for such receipt, see Powell v. Knight, 74 F. Supp. 191
(1947),

noted in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 275.

4 Emphasis has been added. The full text of the affidavit is set
Ill. App. 106 at 110, 85 N. E. (2d) 467 at 469.
5 See comment in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 159-62 on the case
District Court, 116 Colo. 330, 180 P. (2d) 525 (1947), dealing with
use substituted service against a resident who leaves the state after
but before service has been obtained.

forth in 337

of Carlson v.
the right to
the accident
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seem that the affidavit should affirmatively allege all basic facts necessary.
These facts are (1) that process has been served on the Secretary of
State; (2) that notice of such service, and a copy of the process so served,
has been sent, within ten days thereafter, by registered mail, to defendant
at his last known address; and (3) that the action arose out of the use and
operation of a vehicle, over the highways of Illinois, by one who was, at
the time the action accrued, then a nonresident of Illinois. The views
expressed in the instant case would seem to be preferred over the holding
in Biddle v. Boyd,6 involving a similar point, where the court made much
of the fact that defendant did not deny nonresidence at the time of the
accident. The desirability of having all jurisdictional facts disclosed in
the record should be apparent.

COURTS--UNITED

STATES

COURTS--WHETHER

STATE STATUTE,

WHICH

PROHIBITS THE BRINGING OF A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION IN STATE COURT
WHERE CAUSE

AROSE

ELSEWHERE,

OPERATES

TO

LIMIT FEDERAL

COURT

SITTING IN THE SAME JURISDICTION-The Illinois Injuries Act prohibits

the bringing of an action in Illinois to recover damages for a death occurring outside of the state where a right of action for such death exists
under the law of the place where such death happened provided service of
process may be had upon the defendant in such place.' In Davidson v.
Gardner,2 the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit,
was called on to decide whether this prohibition also extended to a federal
court sitting in Illinois. Briefly, the fact situation was that the plaintiff's
husband was killed, while in the course of his employment as a railroad
switchman for the Burlington Railroad Company, in Kansas City, Missouri.
Death was caused when the decedent stepped into the path of a locomotive
operated by the Alton Railroad Company, of which the defendant was
trustee. Suit was brought in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois on two counts; one based on the Federal
Employers' Liability Act,3 the other under the Missouri wrongful death
statute. The principal defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that
the District Court did not have jurisdiction by reason of the Illinois
statute referred to above. The motion was denied and, after trial, judgment was awarded to the plaintiff. This judgment was affirmed on appeal
when the Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the decision in the case of
8 8 Harr. (Del.) 469, 193 A. 593 (1937).
1 Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 70, § 2.
2 172 F. (2d) 188 (1949).

3 45 U. S. C. A. § 51 et seq.
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Stephenson v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company4 was controlling
on the point that the extent of the jurisdiction of federal courts is solely
a matter of congressional bestowal and not subject to limitation by any

5

state agency or statute, the rule of Erie Railroad Company v. Tonpkins

being confined solely to matters of substance and not of jurisdiction. The
significance of the case becomes apparent, however, and its soundness open
to doubt, when it

is contrasted with two recent cases decided by the

United States Supreme Court shortly after the opinion in the instant case
was handed down.

In

6
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation

and in Woods v. Interstate Realty Company,7 the highest court held that
state statutes regulating proceedings in state courts were binding on
federal courts when exercising jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of

citizenship.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER-APPEAL---WHETHER MOTION TO
VACATE JUDGMENT AND GRANT NEw TRIAL, UNSUPPORTED BY AFFIDAVIT,
STAYS RUNNING OF TIME WITHIN WHICH TO PERFECT APPFAL-In the
recent case of Atlas Finishing Company v. Anderson,' the Appellate
Court for the First District was

required

to determine

whether

the

five-day limitation for the perfection of appeals in forcible entry and
detainer suits 2 begins to run from the date of entry of the judgment or
from the date of disposition of a motion that the judgment be vacated and
a new trial granted, where the case is heard by the court without a jury

and the motion is unaccompanied by affidavit. The plaintiff's suit for
possession of the premises was heard by the court without a jury,
resulting in a judgment in favor of plaintiff on March 12th. On March
A. L. R. 455 (1940).
5 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).
6U. S. -, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. (adv.) 1221 (1949). Douglas, J., with
whom Frankfurter, J., concurred, wrote a dissenting opinion, as did Rutledge, J.
The case involved the applicability of a New Jersey statute, requiring security
for costs in a stockholder's representative suit, to a case pending in a federal
court.
7- U. S. -, 69 S. Ct. 1235, 93 L. Ed. (adv.) 1245 (1949). Jackson, J., wrote
a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Rutledge, J., and Burton, J. The case dealt
with the force of a Mississippi statute which made void all contracts entered into
by unlicensed foreign corporations. The majority required that the statute be applied to the federal court proceeding.
1 336 Ill. App. 167, 83 N. E. (2d) 177 (1949). Niemeyer, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion. Information received from Eugene H. Dupee, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff,
indicates that appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was granted on a certificate of
importance but, following a settlement, the appeal was dismissed pursuant to stipulation of the parties.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 57, § 19.
4 110 F. (2d) 401, 132

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW.

19th, defendant filed a written motion specifically asking that the judgment
be vacated and a new trial be granted. That motion was denied on the day
on which it was filed. On March 23rd, within five days after the denial
of defendant's motion but on the eleventh day after entry of judgment,
defendant filed notice of appeal, both from the judgment and also from
the final order denying the motion. Upon plaintiff's motion, the Appellate
Court, one judge dissenting, dismissed the appeal on the ground that it
was not properly perfected. The majority held that, as defendant's
motion failed to comply with the provisions of the Civil Practice Act
requiring that good cause for the vacating of a judgment be shown by
affidavit,' the same should not be considered as a motion to vacate the
judgment but rather a motion for new trial, particularly in view of the
fact that the defendant so labelled it in its notice of appeal. Granting
that Section 68 of the Civil Practice Act prevents truly final judgment
in jury cases until motions for new trial are disposed of,4 the court held
that that section did not apply to cases heard by the court without a jury,'
hence defendant's motion did not affect the finality of the judgment and,
a fortiori, did not stay the running of the jurisdictional time limitation
for the perfection of an appeal. 6
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Niemeyer laid great stress on the
well-established principle that, where a motion to vacate is made within
thirty days of entry of a judgment, no judgment can be regarded as final
until the motion is disposed of.7 It is to be noted, however, that the
majority opinion does not reject that rule. On the contrary, from the
manner in which the court went to great length to distinguish the motion
in the instant case from a motion to vacate a judgment, it is to be
inferred that, had the defendant's motion been construed to be one of
the latter type, a different result would have followed. The majority was
of the opinion that Section 50 of the Civil Practice Act,8 which requires
that good cause be shown by affidavit in support of a motion to vacate
a judgment, was controlling over the older provisions of the Judgment
3 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 174'.
4

Ibid., Ch. 110, § 192.

5 The court cited Climax Tag Co. v. American Tag Co., 234 Ill. 179, 84 N. E. 873
11908), which held that a motion for new trial in non-jury cases Is neither required
nor authorized by law or the rules of practice, and can serve no purpose whatever
in preserving questions for review.
6 See Chicago Housing Authority v. Frank, 335 Ill. App. 456, 82 N. E. (2d) 205
(1948).
7 Hosking v. Southern Pac. Co., 243 Ill. 230, 90 N. E. 669 (1910) ; Majewski v.
Pozdol, 19S Ill. App. 400 (1915).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 174.
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Act, silent on the point." The motion in question, lacking an affidavit,
was said to be a motion for some other purpose. The dissenting judge,
by contrast, was of the opinion that the right to move within thirty days
to vacate judgment should not be restricted to the remedy provided by
the Civil Practice Act 1 ° and that, regardless to the name given, the
motion was, in substance, a motion to vacate the judgment and should
have been given that effect.
The dissenting opinion is not without support in its holding that
the motion involved should have been given the effect of a motion to
vacate judgment. In the earlier case of Hosking v. Southern Pacific
Company, 1 where the trial court heard the case without a jury and the
motion was similar to the one in the instant case, the Appellate Court
held that, although a motion for a new trial in non-jury cases is entirely
useless so far as preserving any question for review is concerned, no rule
of law prevents the trial judge from entertaining such a motion and it is,
in effect, an application for a rehearing which, when entertained, suspends
the finality of the judgment already entered. The Supreme Court, affirming the decision, also treated the motion as one to vacate a judgment,
sufficient to stay the same and prevent time from running. The instant
decision would also seem to be in direct conflict with the holding in
Geisler v. Bank of Brussels,12 wherein the court indicated that the
pertinent provisions of the Judgment Act were controlling over the Civil
Practice Act provisions rather than vice versa. The present case, then,
appears to produce an unwarranted technical application of the Civil
Practice Act not in harmony with its avowed purposes. 3

NEGLIGENCE-ACTIONS--WHETHER

ALLEGATION

OF

FREEDOM

FROM

CONTRIBUTORY WILLFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT IS ESSENTIAL IN STATEMENT OF CASE BASED ON DEFENDANT'S WILLFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT

-In

the recent case of Prater v. Buell,' the plaintiff filed suit to recover

for injuries allegedly resulting from the purported willful and wanton
9 Ibid., Ch. 77, § 83.

10 The dissenting judge cited Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Legg,
374 Ill. 306, 29 N. E. (2d) 515 (1940). That case held that a court has inherent
power to vacate a judgment during term time independently of any statutory
authority.
11 148 Ill. App. 11 (1909), affirmed in 243 Ill. 320, 90 N. E. 669 (1910).
12316 Il1. App. 309, 44 N. E. (2d) 754 (1942), abst. opin.
13 Counsel for plaintiff notes that the ruling may have significance in other
proceedings, beside forcible detainer cases, where the appeal period is shorter than
the one generally applicable to civil suits. He specifically refers to cases under
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 46, § 6 et seq., and Ch. 102, § 16.
1336 Ill. App. 533, 84 N. E. (2d) 676 (1949).
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misconduct of the defendant who owned and operated a dairy farm upon
which the plaintiff worked as a farm hand. While the plaintiff was driving
a herd of cattle to the barn, as part of his regularly prescribed duties,
he was gored by a bull. The complaint charged willful and wanton
misconduct on the part of defendant in that he had repeatedly baited and
annoyed the bull thereby greatly increasing its vicious propensities. The
defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had failed
to state a cause of action, inasmuch as his complaint did not allege freedom
from contributory willful and wanton misconduct, was sustained. On
appeal from a judgment dismissing the suit because plaintiff refused to
plead further, the Appellate Court for the Third District affirmed the
ruling. In this, the first case in Illinois which has held that an allegation
of freedom from contributory willful and wanton misconduct is an essential allegation in a complaint charging the defendant with similar conduct,
the court has based its holding on the same principle which has led to the
well-settled doctrine that freedom from contributory negligence is an
essential allegation in an action based on simple negligence.2 The principle
that no one shall be permitted to profit from a wrong to which he has
contributed has also been applied in suits based on willful and wanton
misconducts but it does not appear that an allegation of freedom from
conduct of that type has heretofore been regarded as necessary to the
statement of a case. 4 Now that the same has become essential, the customary phrase to the effect that plaintiff was "exercising due care and
caution for his own safety" may be insufficient in view of the fact that
the presence of simple negligence is no defense to a suit based on willful
misconduct.5

PLEADING-PROFERT,

OYER

AND

EXHIBITS-WHETHER

NECESSARY

ALLEGATIONS OF A COMPLAINT MAY BE SUPPLIED BY AN UNNECESSARY ExHIBIT

ATTACHED TO COMPLAINT-The Appellate Court for the First Dis-

trict had opportunity in the late case of Morris v. Broadview, Inc.,' to
2Hanson v. Trust Co. of Chicago, 380 Ill. 194, 43 N. E. (2d) 931 (1942).
3 Walsh v. Gazin, 316 Ill. App. 311, 45 N. E. (2d) 95 (1942). A special interrogatory finding plaintiff guilty of willful and wanton misconduct was there set
aside as being unsupported by the evidence.
4 The complaint in Walsh v. Gazin, 316 Ill. App. 311, 45 N. E. (2d) 95 (1942),
tbe most recent one on the subject, seems merely to have alleged that the plaintiff
was "in the exercise of ordinary care."
5 Heidenreich v. Bremner, 260 Ill. 439, 103 N. E. 275 (1913).
1338 Il. App. 99, 86 N. E. (2d) 863 (1949).
Niemeyer, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion. See also the related case of Morris v. Broadview, Inc., 385 Ill. 228, 52 N. E.
(2d) 769 (1944), reversing 317 Ill. App. 436, 46 N. E. (2d) 174 (1943), noted in 22
CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw 201.
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discuss the effect of Section 36 of the Civil Practice Act.2 Plaintiff therein
was a certificate holder in the defendant corporation and had requested,
by mail, a list of all other corporate certificate holders, beneficiaries of a
trust, for the purpose, as stated therein, of "discussing with them the
advisability of opposing any attempt by you to further extend the trust
and insisting upon a sale of the property. "3 Upon defendant's refusal to
comply, plaintiff filed a complaint in equity asking, among other things,
for an order compelling the defendant to furnish the list of certificate
holders. The complaint itself contained no allegation as to plaintiff's
purpose in making the request but, in the copy of plaintiff's letter to
defendant attached to the complaint as an exhibit, the purpose was there
set out. The trial court struck the complaint on motion and dismissed
the suit on the ground that the Business Corporation Act, 4 upon which
plaintiff rested his claim, required that the list be given only for a proper
purpose which should have been specifically alleged in the complaint, and
the exhibit attached, not being required by Section 36 of the Civil Practice
Act, merely served as evidence of the demand and nothing more. The
Appellate Court reversed, one justice dissenting, when it decided that the
words of Section 36 to the effect that, in pleading any written instrument,
a "copy thereof may be attached to the pleading as an exhibit" and that
"the exhibit shall constitute a part of the pleading for all purposes,"
mean exactly what they apparently seem to say. Although the first part
of the code section clearly refers to the attaching of certain mandatory
exhibits on which the claim is founded, 5 not concerned here, the last portion
is cast in permissive language.6 The final sentence thereof, declaring exhibits to be parts of the pleading "for all purposes," has now been made
to apply to both types of exhibits. The advantage, from the standpoint of
the plaintiff, is obvious.
WILLs--RIGHTS

AND

LIABILITIES

OF

DEVISEES

AND

LEGATEES-

WHETHER ILLINOIS PROBATE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ORDER CONSERVATOR OF INCOMPETENT LEGATEE TO RENOUNCE WILL ON WARD'S BEHALF--

Under the appeal taken in the recent case of In re Reighard's Estate,1 the
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 160.
3 338 Ill. App. 99 at 102, 86 N. E. (2d) 863 at 864-5.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 157.45.
5 Failure to attach exhibits of this character, or give adequate explanation for
the failure, will make the complaint subject to a motion to strike: Sarelas v.
Fagerburg, 316 Ill. App. 606, 45 N. E. (2d) 690 (1943).
6 See Nichols, Illinois Civil Practice (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1941), Vol. 2,
p. 34, § 794.
1402 Ill. 364, 84 N. E. (2d) 345 (1949).
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Illinois Supreme Court was asked to consider whether an Illinois county
court had the power to order the conservator of an incompetent person's
estate to renounce a will in behalf of his ward. The will there concerned
devised a portion of the estate to a trustee who also served as executor.
The trustee was directed to pay the net income from the trust estate to
the testator's surviving widow for life with a remainder over upon her
death. The will further provided that, if any person entitled to the
payment of money under the will should become disabled, the trustee
should retain all monies so payable and apply only so much thereof as
he deemed necessary for the proper support and maintenance of the
disabled beneficiary. One month after the will was admitted to probate,
the testator's widow was declared incompetent by the same county court
and a conservator was appointed over her person and estate. He filed a
petition in the court of his appointment seeking a direction as to whether
he should renounce the will in behalf of the widow and was ordered so to
do. The trustee and executor, having been notified of the proceeding and
having participated in the hearing thereon, appealed to the circuit court,
claiming that the petition should be dismissed on the ground that the
county court, and the circuit court on appeal, each lacked jurisdiction in
that renunciation might be ordered only by a court of chancery. It was
also urged that the proceeding, being an ex parte one, should be dismissed
for want of necessary parties. The motion was denied and the order was
affirmed. On further appeal to the Supreme Court,2 that decision was
affirmed on the authority of the earlier case of Davis v. Mather.3 That
case had held that an Illinois probate court, under a statute conferring
equitable jurisdiction over the estates of incompetent wards,4 did have
the power to order a renunciation of a will whenever it was determined
that such action was for the best interest of the incompetent ward.
Although the statute referred to therein was since repealed, the sense
thereof forms the present Section 50 of the new Probate Act.5 The practice
has not, in this respect, been in anyway changed from that which
formerly prevailed.'

2 Direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was proper under Ill. Rev. Stat.
1947, Ch. 110, § 199(1).
3 309 Ill. 284, 141 N. E. 209 (1923).
4 Hurd's Rev. Stat. 1921, Ch. 3, § 78.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 202.
6 The court also noted that, as renunciation is a matter of right, there is no
occasion for notifying the legatees and devisees of the fact of renunciation except
as the same is made of record, hence an ex parte proceeding to obtain direction
with regard thereto is proper.

RECENT 1LLIN IS DECISIONS.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATiON-RELATION
ACT

AND

OCCUPATIONS

GOVERNED

OF PARTIES TO COMPENSATION

THEREBY-WHETHER

RELATION

OF

PARENT AND CHILD PREVENTS MINOR SON FROM BEING AN EMPLOYEE OF
HIS FATHER

WITHIN

MEANING

OF ILLINOIS

WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

AcT-Attention is directed to the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court

for the First District in the case of Victor v. Dehmlow' wherein the court
had to determine whether or not the minor son of the deceased defendant
was an employee of the latter within the meaning of that term as used
in the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act. 2 The question became
important in order to decide whether the defendant was entitled to the
benefits of Section 29 thereof3 or whether plaintiff might maintain an
action for the wrongful death of her intestate husband. The cause arose
out of an accident in which the plaintiff's intestate was struck and killed
by defendant's truck operated by defendant's minor son. The son had
been sent on a business errand and was returning to the place of business
when the accident occurred. It was conceded that the employer of
plaintiff's intestate as well as defendant's intestate were operating under
the act at the time of the accident but it was urged that the death of
plaintiff's intestate did not arise out of and in the course of his employment and also that the minor son was not an employee of his father at
the time of the accident. In support of the latter contention, it was
shown in evidence that the son was a school boy, that he was not paid
wages, that no social security taxes were paid for him, that he drove the
truck for his father only after school hours, and that his father supported

4
him; all tending to show an absence of any contractual relationship.
Both issues were resolved in favor of plaintiff at the trial and she
recovered judgment. An appeal by defendant forced consideration of the
same two points.

It was decided that the deceased employee died from an accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment, 5 and that the minor
1336 Ill. App. 432, 84 N. E. (2d) 342 (1949).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 138 et seq.
3 Ibid., Ch. 48, § 166. That section is intended to govern those situations in which
the employee is injured through the negligent conduct of someone other than his
employer. If the offending party is also bound by the Act, the injured person's
employer is obligated to provide him with compensation benefits, the injured employee being limited to the statutory remedy, while all right to recover from the
offending party is transferred to the employer of the injured party. Otherwise, the
injured party has an election to recover from his employer, with subrogation
accordingly, or to proceed directly against the offending party in a common law
action.
4 Ibid., Ch. 48, § 142(second), defines an "employee" as one "in the service of
another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written . . . including aliens, and minors."
5 That ruling, while important to the outcome of the case, was not novel.
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son, driving the truck, was a covered employee because of the evident
legislative purpose to include as such even those who had no fixed rate
of compensation.6 The court found no occasion to distinguish between
minors employed by strangers and those employed by their parents. The
case, however, has far-reaching implications for, if the minor so employed
is a covered employee where third persons are concerned, it would seem
to follow that he should also be treated as such when he becomes the
victim of an industrial accident connected with the parent's business. 7 A
way now seems to have been opened up to claims for compensation by
minors who perform only casual services, often exacted by the parent as
a part of the child's training. It would seem, then, that stronger proof
should have been required to establish a contract of hiring than appears
in the record of the instant case, unless the court is willing to permit any
minor child to have his action against the parent for physical harm
suffered at the parent's hands.

6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 147(f), provides a method for the computation of
compensation to be paid to an employee who receives no fixed wage.
7A wage-earning but unemancipated minor child has been held entitled to compensation benefits against the parent's insurance carrier, despite the general public
policy forbidding suits between parent and child over Injury inflicted by the one
on the other, in Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A. L. R. 1055
(1930).

BOOK REVIEWS
REvFNuE ACT OF 1948:

Legislative History Series. Paul A. Wolkin and
Marcus Manoff. Albany, New York: Matthew Bender & Company,
1948. Pp. xxiv, 667.

Within the last half century, the United States Supreme Court has
effected a considerable change in tack in statutory interpretative theory.1
While the recent tendency to examine minutely into the legislative history of a given statute is certainly the more rational approach, that tendency imposes an almost insuperable burden on the attorney. He can no
longer feel secure in his knowledge of a law merely from reading the
text of an enacted statute. He must, instead, become adept at predicting
what the court will determine Congress had in mind when enacting the
law and what it intended that statute should mean. To be able to do so
takes more than clairvoyance; it requires a careful study of the voluminous mass of data to be found, among other places, in the congressional
hearings and debates incident to the passage of the particular statute.
The United States Supreme Court, the government attorneys, and perhaps
some of the more prosperous law firms, will have this material available.
The average firm or the individual lawyer, however, could hardly afford
to house, let alone collect and index, the huge mass of printed matter
which may have been produced. Even assuming that it was available, a
vast amount of time-consuming effort would be required to winnow the
chaff of the irrelevant, immaterial political soundings from the pertinent
thinking on the point.
The editors of this book, cognizant of the problem created by the
general inaccessibility of legislative material and its normally disorganized state, have set out to encroach upon chaos. Their approach is
eminently logical. They chose, for purpose of demonstrating the utility
of their plan, a single federal statute, the Revenue Act of 1948. They

'The court once said that "the province of construction lies wholly within the
domain of ambiguity. . . ." See Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U. S. 414 at 421, 20
S. Ct. 155 at 158, 44 L. Ed. 219 at 222 (1899). In more recent years, by contrast,
the court has noted that "there is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the
purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give
expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves
to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed
their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results,
however, this court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act.
Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results
but merely an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole' this court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal
words." See United States v. American Trucking Association, 310 U. S. 534 at
543, 60 S. Ct. 1059 at 1063, 84 L. Ed. 1345 at 1350 (1940).
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gathered all of the material concerning its legislative history and arranged
that material in a planned sequence under the section, or sub-section, of
the act to which the material related. In addition to editorial reorganization, they liberally applied a blue pencil to congressional verbiage which
pertained to no section of the statute when viewed from a dispassionate
standpoint. By and large, the editing has been done with discrimination
and with ready reference to title and source for those who desire more
complete information. There has been no attempt made at editorial
rationalization nor is this a textual restatement of the law. The book
does, however, reduce to intelligible status the source material, hence it
should prove invaluable to workers in the tax field. For counsel preparing an appellate brief on a tax question, the book is clearly a "must."
One may, however, indulge in some speculation regarding the volume.
The editors, both from the standpoint of practical utility and also that of
conserving space, have been obliged to delete considerable of the material
brought out in the congressional hearings and debates, material which
was deemed unessential to or unrelated to the statute. The necessary
consequence is that the reader must rely on the editors' perspicacity if
entire dependence is to be placed on this volume rather than on the
original source materials. When one reads, for example, the purely
political, self-laudatory exchange between Representatives Reeves and
Dingell, as it appears on pages 200-4, one's faith is somewhat shaken.
An even more serious defect, one which it is hoped will be cured in
later works of the series, is the failure to date the material cited. It is
true that there is a chart setting forth the chronology of events as they
appear in the Congressional Record, but there is no inkling of date for
the House and Senate Hearings. Unless the reader is able, constantly,
to make reference to the chart he will rapidly lose all sense of time, a
factor the significance of which ought not be lost.
E. G. R0OBBINS

TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS: The Art of Jury Persuasion. Francis
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1949.
X. Busch. Indianapolis:
Pp. xxvii, 1147.

LAW AND

The principal title for this book should be especially noticed for the
work in question deals with both law and tactics in the conduct of jury
trials. No case, of course, can be properly tried without an observance
to the requirements of law. Until one has become thoroughly seasoned in
practice, however, the appearance of tactics as a trial problem is less
manifest. The term "tactics," primarily a military expression, has been
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much bandied about and often improperly used. The author, long a
prominent member of the Illinois bar, as well as being dean-emeritus
of a mid-western law school, uses the term in its strictly proper sense. It
has been defined as the "art of handling troops in the presence of the
enemy" from whence comes the secondary meaning of "any method of
procedure, especially of adroit devices or expedients to accomplish an
end." Viewed in that light, the work most ably discusses and illustrates
the strategic uses to be made of available trial materials. It relies upon
tested courtroom procedures.
The scope of the contents of this book is broad. It delves into historical backgrounds, elucidates upon the right to jury trial, and comments on the selection of jurors, both from the standpoint of their
qualifications and their challenge. It advises on the preparation and
presentation of a case, with unusually authentic treatment of the subject
of direct examination. It is honest, realistic and complete in its treatment of the process of cross-examination. It covers other aspects of the
trial, yet finds space in which to deal with such specialized matters as the
use of expert testimony, opinion evidence, jury argument, instructions and
verdicts. Each point made is replete with citation to authority and, whenever possible, verbatim excerpts from actual trial records, in question and
answer form, have been used for illustrative purposes. The book is both
scholarly and practical, as might well be expected from one with Mr.
Busch's background. All in all, it is as complete and authoritative a
work as may be found between the covers of a single volume.
R. S.

ORGANIZING

CORPORATE

AND

BAUER

BUSINEss
ENTERPRISES.
Chester
Matthew Bender & Company, 1949.

OTHER

Rohrlich. Albany, New York:
Pp. xv, 533.

A conventional law textbook usually purports to provide answers to
all the. questions apt to develop in the given field, the answers being arranged in schematic fashion by subjects. Here is an unconventional
work. It takes up the problem of organizing a business enterprise,
whether in corporate or other form, but it provides a parallel rather
than a topical discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages
of each type of business arrangement. The reader is left to decide for
himself, not asked to accept the author's judgment in the matter. It
should not be inferred that the author lacks judgment; he is, in fact, a
practicing lawyer, a writer of legal articles and a law teacher of graduate
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rank. It is the suggestive, instead of the exhaustive, character of the
publication which provides one of its finest features.
The entire field is surveyed, from the preliminary discussions,
through protection against disclosures, problems of promotion, selection
of domicile, incorporation procedures, and capitalization and financing.
Organization is not limited to the creation of the utterly new but includes
discussion of the taking over of existing enterprises. Just as the preacher
contemplates the grave at moment of baptism, so the lawyer is urged and
shown how to give attention to death and its attendant consequences on
the business being organized at the moment of its birth. No small part
of the book is devoted to tax matters. In fact, some eighty pages have
been turned over to tables disclosing the tax expense or saving attendant
upon the choice of one form of enterprise over another, material not
readily available elsewhere. The argument which has been raging over
whether dividend rights on preferred stock should be vested or not has
been aptly summarized and tendencies in the law have been charted.
Other expected features in a work of this character have not been overlooked. The lawyer may here well find guidance in a not uncomplicated
field.
W. F. ZAcHAws

